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I. THE PUZZLE: WHY PRESS PRECAUTION BEYOND THE POINT OF
COST-JUSTIFICATION?
A. The Clash Between Economic "Science" and Ordinary Moral
Sensibility
Years ago, Bruce Ackerman contrasted two competing
perspectives on law, that of the "ordinary observer" and that of the
"scientific policymaker."' The perceptions and discourse of the
"ordinary observer," Ackerman explained, start from the common
practices and language of laymen. 2 The "scientific policymaker" takes
the realization of particular objectives-efficient precaution against
risks of accidental injury and death, for example-as her end and uses
the law as an instrument toward that end.3 Clashes between these two
perspectives are endemic to our legal culture.4 Nowhere in the law of
accidents is that conflict sharper than in cases where the risks
imposed threaten severe and irreparable injury.
A powerful and influential tradition of thought asserts that
reasonable care in the law of negligence is, and ought to be,
economically efficient care. When Learned Hand devised his famous
"formula" for determining the amount of care due, Richard Posner
argues, he was both "adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic
meaning of negligence," and attempting nothing more novel than to
"make explicit the standard that the courts had long applied."5 Judge
Hand, as Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen explain, "set the legal
standard of care by explicitly balancing the benefits and costs of
precaution, just as an economist would have done .... -6 So conceived,
reasonable care is the level of precaution that minimizes the combined
costs of preventing and paying for accidents, thereby maximizing the
wealth at society's disposal. Precaution should be taken until a penny
1. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20 (1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The Revenge
of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 728-37 (1992) (arguing that traditional tort law
better fits the realm of the ordinary observer, whereas contemporary tort law is driven by
scientific policymaking).
5. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 360 (1988) [hereinafter COOTER
& ULEN 1988]. In the most recent edition of their textbook, Cooter and Ulen take the same
position, albeit a bit less explicitly. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
314-15 (3d ed. 2000) ('Repeated application of the Hand rule enables adjudicators to discover the
efficient level of care.").
2003] 655
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more spent to prevent accidents yields less than a penny's reduction in
expected accident costs.
The economic interpretation of reasonable care has been
enormously influential, but it remains deeply problematic. It equates
reasonable care with rational care, and spells rationality out in
economic terms.7 The average reasonable person thinks and acts as a
single, economically rational actor would, if she bore both the costs
and the benefits of precaution. An unreasonable person, by contrast,
gives more weight to the benefits she gains by imposing risks on
others than to the costs that her risks impose on others.8 Put this way,
the economic interpretation of due care seems almost innocuous.
Reasonable people, surely, take the costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action into account in deciding what to do, and reasonable
people weigh those costs and benefits impartially. If anything is
unreasonable, assuming that my interests are objectively more
important than someone else's-just because they are my interests-is
unreasonable.
But the economic interpretation is not innocuous when it comes
to fixing the appropriate measure of precaution when life itself is at
stake. 9 Cost-benefit analysis treats all human interests-urgent ones
like adequate nutrition and physical integrity and luxuries like the
consumption of fine wines-as fungible at some ratio of exchange and
insists that the cost-justified level of precaution is the only level of
precaution that is ever justified. 10 More stringent precaution simply
squanders resources. Our common law of negligence, by contrast,
treats the physical integrity of the person as an especially urgent
interest, and our juries are repulsed by the claim that accidental
deaths should not be prevented whenever the costs of prevention
7. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 325-27, 337-39 (1996).
8. COOTER & ULEN 1988, supra note 6, at 360:
[R]easonableness requires the decisionmaker to give similar weight to the cost of more
precaution, which he bears, and the benefit of more precaution in terms of the reduced
frequency and severity of accidents, which others enjoy. His behavior is unreasonable
and his precaution is faulty when he gives more weight to the costs he bears than to
benefits it creates for others.
This exact passage is not found in the current, third edition of the book. However, nothing in the
third edition suggests that Cooter and Ulen have or would repudiate the ideas expressed in the
passage.
9. It may not be innocuous in other ways as well. For one thing, reasonableness resists
reduction to rationality. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 7, at 312.
10. For an important recent attempt by a legal economist to wrestle with this problem, see
Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More
than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001).
[Vol. 56:653656
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exceed the value-economically conceived-of the lives at risk.11
According to the folk wisdom of product liability lawyers:
[O]ne argument that you should almost never make is that the manufacturer
deliberately included a dangerous feature in the product's design because of the high
monetary cost that the manufacturer would have incurred in choosing another design. If
you do argue this, you're almost certain to lose on liability, and you can expose yourself
to punitive damages as well. 
12
Jury practice and economic prescription are at odds with one another.
B. The Need for a Moral Theory to Buttress Our Moral Sensibility
If the economic interpretation of reasonable care is at odds
with jury practice, the claim that precaution should be pressed beyond
the point of cost-justification is underdeveloped. Whatever its faults,
the idea of cost-justified precaution is comparatively well articulated
and understood. Negligence law's norm of reasonable care in the
circumstances, by contrast, has not given rise to conceptually well-
defined and clear alternatives to cost-justified precaution.13
Noneconomic students of negligence law have not explained why more
than cost-justified precaution might indeed be appropriate when life
itself is threatened with severe and irreparable injury. Nor have they
explained just how much more precaution is appropriate.
My aim in this Article is to examine two statutory norms which
prescribe more than cost-justified precaution-the "safety" and
"feasibility" norms-and to show that an idea of fairness supports
these norms. The safety and the feasibility norms both specify
conceptually well-defined alternatives to cost-justified precaution. 14
11. For the point about the structure of the common law, see Keating, supra note 7, at 364-
67. For the point about jury practice, see, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto
Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038 (1991), and W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 115-26 (2001).
12. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1038. This lesson is taken to be the moral of Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
13. This is largely because the practice of negligence adjudication involves jury application
of the general legal standard of reasonable care to particular fact patterns. This application leads
to particular judgments of reasonableness but not to a conceptual refinement of the norm itself.
Reasonable care is sometimes given precise form in rules through the adoption of customarily or
statutorily prescribed precautions, but this enterprise, too, does not generate much in the way of
the conceptual refinement or specification of the idea of reasonableness.
14. See Physical Harm in the Modern State, in ROBERT E. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH &
GREGORY C. KEATING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 930-91 (3d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW] (showing that these norms are articulated
in federal law as alternatives to the norm of cost-justified precaution). My exposition of the
safety and feasibility standards in this Article, in Part II as well as in this section, follows these
materials and the accompanying chapter of ROBERT E. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH &
GREGORY C. KEATING, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 20-1 to 20-
16 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL].
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The safety (or safe-level) standard requires the elimination of all
significant risks of physical harm, and the feasibility standard
requires the elimination of all significant risks which can be
eliminated without crippling the activity at issue.15 The safety
standard rejects the conceptual framework of cost-benefit analysis
because it fixes the acceptable level of risk without inquiring into the
benefit lost by not imposing more risk. The feasibility standard rejects
the conceptual framework of cost-benefit analysis because feasibility
analysis takes practical possibility-not maximal benefit-as its
guiding aim. 16
The norms of safe and feasible precaution are related to the
idea of reasonableness at work in negligence law in two ways-one
negative, the other positive. The negative relation is the rejection of
efficient precaution as a complete and sufficient measure of
appropriate precaution. The idea that care must be reasonable, not
rational, asserts that it is a mistake to reduce reasonable conduct to
efficient conduct, fair conduct to wealth-maximizing conduct. The
safety and feasibility standards likewise reject the idea that efficient
care is sufficient. Both of these norms press precaution beyond the
point of cost-justification. The positive relation between the statutory
norms of safety and feasibility and the common law norm of
reasonableness is a shared commitment to fairness. The common law
of negligence gives pride of place to fairness because it gives pride of
place to reasonableness, and fairness is a prominent aspect of
reasonableness. 17 Statutory risk regulation in accordance with the
safety and feasibility standards gives a prominent place to fairness
because agencies, advocates, and courts cite fairness as a principal
justification for those norms.18 In both cases, general ideas of fairness
also provide a powerful justification for pressing precaution beyond
the point of cost-justification.
15. See infra Part III.
16. I adapt this summary from Lewis Sargentich's note on "Feasibility" in KEETON ET AL.,
TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 953. Throughout this Article, my presentation of the
safety and feasibility norms follows and builds on Sargentich's casebook and teacher's manual
materials. See supra note 14, at 20-1 to 20-16.
17. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48-50 (rev. ed. 1996) (linking
reasonableness and fairness); Keating, supra note 7, at 325-27, 337-39 (arguing that the
fundamental commitment of negligence law is to reasonable care, not to economically rational
care).
18. See KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 963-64, 968-70.
[Vol. 56:653658
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Economic theory is deeply critical of pressing precaution
beyond the point of cost-justification. Cost-justified precaution is
efficient precaution. Economically speaking, it is irrational to press
precaution beyond the efficient point. Precautions taken once the point
of cost-justified precaution has been reached yield less in dollars saved
than they cost in dollars spent. We would be richer if we chose not to
take the extra precautions demanded by the safety and feasibility
norms. Insofar as they insist on taking more than cost-justified
precaution, feasible precaution and safe precaution make us worse off,
not better off.19 Our welfare could be improved by retreating back to
the point of cost-justified precaution and by putting the money saved
to better use elsewhere. 20 Why, then, should society ever press
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification?
19. The claim that it is wasteful and irrational to take more than cost-justified precaution is
fundamental to the economic analysis of risk and precaution. See, e.g., Herman B. Leonard &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in
VALUES AT RISK 31, 35 (Douglas MacClean ed., 1986) (Centralized decisions of whether or not to
impose a risk should be made by choosing the "alternative ... for which benefits most exceed
costs. This standard is often referred to as 'efficiency'. The underlying notion is that it is wasteful
to choose the alternatives that do not provide the maximum possible 'net benefits' or 'surplus.' ");
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 17 (1984) (explaining" 'not efficient' merely
means that I can think of something better-something potentially better from the points of view
of all parties concerned"); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52
(2002) ("[ljndividuals will be made worse off overall whenever consideration of fairness leads to
the choice of a regime different from that which would be adopted under welfare economics ...
."). Kaplow and Shavell fault an earlier paper of mine, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, precisely because it "clearly would make everyone worse off ... " Id. at 87 n.5.
This Article develops the claim made in Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory-
that fairness does justify more than efficient precaution in certain kinds of cases-in detail.
20. Guido Calabresi, perhaps the finest tort scholar of the past fifty years, has repeatedly
worried about the apparent irrationality of spending "millions of dollars to save the lives of
clearly identified individuals who are in immediate danger-dollars, which, if applied to
generalized safety, would protect and preserve many more." GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS,
ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 6 (1985). Compare id. at 1-19, with GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 39 (1978) (stating that "[t]o the extent that our lives and institutions
depend on the notion that life is beyond price, such a refusal to save lives is horribly costly").
This argument is not the tour de force it seems. For one thing, its disregard of other relevant
considerations leads to some bizarre claims. One statistician, disturbed by the apparent
irrationality of our appraisals of risk, suggests that "rather than introducing legislation about
the nuclear power industry or diet drinks, a rational government should be setting up computer
dating services..." Being unmarried is much more hazardous to a man's health than more
salient hazards such as smoking--"the average loss of life expectancy" associated with being a
male who smokes is 2250 days, and the average loss associated with being an unmarried male is
3500 days. BRIAN S. EVERITT, CHANCE RULES: AN INFORMAL GUIDE TO PROBABILITY, RISK, AND
STATISTICS 128-29 (1999). There is, surely, something wrong with the idea that the statute is as
entitled to regulate marriage as it is to regulate diet drinks. For another thing, making ourselves
better off by putting our lifesaving dollars to their highest use will almost surely result in many
more deaths. There will "[a]lmost always" be "more efficient uses for our lifesaving money" than
using it to save the lives we might save at any given moment. Annette Baier, Poisoning the
Wells, in VALUES AT RISK, supra note 19, at 49, 73 n.22. Plainly, something is wrong with a logic
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One answer-and there may be others-lies in considerations
of fairness and urgency. Fairness is concerned with the distribution of
burdens and benefits-with how well competing claims are satisfied.21
Treating people fairly generally requires us to align burden and
benefit proportionally and to treat competing claims in ways which
can be justified to those whose claims they are.22 When injuries are
not devastating-when the harm they wreak can be fully repaired
through ex post compensation-fairness concerns can be addressed
after risks are imposed and injuries ensue. Redistribution after the
fact of injury can align the burdens and benefits of the risks imposed.23
When risks threaten devastating injury-premature death or severe
harm whose debilitating effects can never be fully undone 24-matters
are different. Fairness must be done at the time that the risk is
imposed, not after it issues in injury. The safe and feasible precaution
standards apply to risks of devastating injury and therefore to
circumstances where fairness must be done ex ante, not ex post.
When devastating injury is risked, it is unfair to treat the
harm being risked as comparable to any benefit which might be
gained, no matter how trivial that benefit is in the lives of those who
reap it. Sacrificing an urgent interest-the interest in avoiding
premature death or devastating injury-for the sake of trivial gains to
others cannot be justified to those whose urgent interests are
sacrificed. It is only fair to ask some people to bear a significant risk of
devastating injury when the burden of eliminating that risk is
comparable to the burden of bearing it. Cost-benefit analysis ignores
this. It treats all costs and all benefits as interests which are fungible
at some ratio of exchange and aggregates costs and benefits across
persons. Cost-benefit analysis supposes that loss of life or health by
some can always be offset by increase in wealth to others, no matter
how trivial the effect of that increased wealth may be in the lives of
those who benefit from it. The mistake here lies not in undervaluing
which requires, at every given moment in time, that we refrain from saving lives now so we can
save more later.
21. See, e.g., John Broome, Fairness, 91 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y, pt. V, at 87-102
(1990-91) ("[F]airness is concerned only with how well each person's claim is satisfied compared
with how well other people's are satisfied. It is concerned only with relative satisfaction not
absolute satisfaction."); see infra Part II.
22. The first point is as old as Aristotle. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 119
(Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 2000) ("[The just is something proportionate .... "). The second is
brought out by the "Kantian interpretation" of "justice as fairness." See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE § 40, at 3-46 (rev. ed. 1999).
23. This idea of fairness is fundamental to enterprise liability. See Gregory C. Keating, The
Idea of Fairness in Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997).
24. The permanent debilitation inflicted by brown lung disease is a case in point.
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life or health. The mistake lies in assuming that trivial benefits and
devastating losses are comparable. They are not, and it is unfair to
treat them as if they are.
Or so I shall argue. Part II develops the claim of fairness made
in the preceding paragraph. Part II.A states the essential argument
directly. Part II.B advances a particular conception of fairness and
explains the normative and conceptual framework which justifies this
conception. This particular conception of fairness holds that risks are
fairly imposed when the terms of their imposition reconcile the
competing claims of two kinds of freedom-freedom to impose risks on
others and freedom from accidental physical injury at the hands of
others-on terms which are to the ex ante advantage of those affected
by them, including especially those most imperiled by them. Each of
these freedoms is a precondition of effective rational agency,
something necessary for us to pursue the projects and activities which
give shape and meaning to our lives. When a practice of risk
imposition puts some-workers in cotton mills or in petroleum
refineries, for example-in particular peril of devastating injury, that
practice is only fair if that peril is to the long-run advantage of those
so imperiled and if it could not have been reduced without imposing a
greater disadvantage on a comparable class of persons affected by the
practice.
Part III explains the federal statutory norms that require more
than cost-justified precaution in certain kinds of cases. It begins by
contrasting cost-justified, feasible, and safe precaution. Part III
explicates the essential elements of feasible and safe precaution
doctrine-the requirement that the risks subject to reduction be
"significant" and the twin demands of "technological" and "economic"
feasibility. Part IV takes up the task of justifying these elements. Its
aim is to build the bridges necessary to show that the general moral
arguments of Part II provide substantial justification for the legal
standards of Part III. After briefly recapitulating earlier claims of
fairness, Part IV turns to justifying the significance requirement. Why
eliminate or feasibly reduce only significant risks of devastating
injury? Why not eliminate all such risks? Part IV argues, in brief, that
a significance requirement is necessary to prevent both safe and
feasible risk reduction from inflicting harms to our liberty greater
than the harms that insignificant risks of devastating injury inflict on
our security. The imposition of insignificant-but real-risks of
devastating injury is so pervasive that the elimination of insignificant
risks of devastating injury would cripple our freedom of action.
The remainder of Part IV and all of Part V explore the claims
of comparability that underpin both safety and feasibility analysis.
2003]
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What kinds of costs are comparable to a significant risk of devastating
injury? Drawing on detailed examples, common law as well as
statutory, Parts IV and V argue that both safety and feasibility
analysis rely on a hierarchical conception of human interests and a
historically and socially contingent account of value. That hierarchical
conception of human interests gives health and safety priority over
lesser goods; that historically and socially contingent conception of
value acknowledges that the urgency of an activity varies with time
and with place. Increased agricultural productivity is a luxury for a
society which can produce food in abundance. That historically
contingent fact justifies subjecting the use of pesticides on agricultural
products to the stringencies of safety-based risk regulation.
Conversely, the historically and socially contingent importance of
petroleum in our society may justify counting the elimination of
petroleum refining as a harm comparable to bearing a significant risk
of devastating injury, even though we know that social worlds have
existed and will exist in which petroleum is unimportant. Part V
argues that feasibility analysis rests on a further and more
contestable claim. Feasibility analysis imposes an efficiency-based
limit on its pursuit of fair risk reduction: it presumes that when an
activity flourishes in a market economy, the elimination of that
activity counts as a harm comparable to death and devastating injury.
Part VI entertains doubts raised by the dependence of
feasibility analysis on both (1) contingent social facts and (2) a market
test of value. Part VI argues that feasibility analysis's dependence on
contingent social facts is less of a cause for concern than it first seems.
(The concern is that physical integrity and health are essential
conditions of rational agency; any given historically and socially
contingent activity is not.) Taken as a class, however, historically and
socially contingent activities are as important as the physical integrity
endangered by risks of devastating injury. Historically and socially
contingent activities are the media through which we meet our
material needs and realize our agency. The fact that we might learn to
forgo any given activity is not proof that we might forgo all of them.
Unless we have particular reason to question the value of an activity,
we have no reason to presume that the abandonment of the activity is
an acceptable cost to bear. The abandonment of all historically and
socially contingent activities would cripple our agency and is an
unacceptable cost. Judgments that a particular activity's continued
presence in our social world is not a game worth the candle of




Part VI also argues that feasibility analysis's acceptance of a
market test of value does limit its commitment to fairness in a way
that is cause for some concern. When an activity flourishes in a
market economy, it is presumptively efficient. And, as long as those
who participate in efficient activities do so voluntarily, rationally, and
with good information, efficient activities are to their advantage in a
Pareto sense: those involved in the activities are better off than they
would be had they refused to participate. But unless the activity takes
place against a background of a just distribution of wealth and income
and a just system of rights, Pareto superiority is no guarantee of
fairness. Activities may flourish which treat those they most
disadvantage unfairly, even though those so disadvantaged are made
better off in a Pareto sense by their participation. In a system such as
South African apartheid-where an entire class (and race) of persons
is disenfranchised-it may be Pareto-superior for members of that
class to accept work so hazardous that no member of an enfranchised
class would ever agree to undertake it-mining diamonds at great
depth and danger, for example. 25 The fact that diamond mining so
conducted was efficient given the distribution of background
entitlements against which it arose, and therefore "to everyone's
advantage" in a Pareto sense, did not guarantee the fairness of the
terms on which the activity was conducted. South African diamond
miners were the victims of grave injustice. By accepting a market test
of the value of activities, feasibility analysis accepts an efficiency limit
on the fairness value it expresses. That limit may well prove
problematic.
Finally, Part VI argues that there is no obvious way to
eliminate this efficiency constraint on fairness. For one thing, the
constraint is embedded in our practice. For another, it is often-
although not always-supported by considerations of institutional
competence and by an appropriate division of institutional labor. The
fairness of the basic productive activities which flourish in a given
society can only be guaranteed by the justice of the institutions within
which those activities occur. In some circumstances, fairness can be
achieved by setting aside a market test of value and by asking if an
activity is to the long-run advantage of those it disadvantages, but in
other circumstances fairness can only be achieved by reforming the
25. See, e.g., Apartheid and Black Labor in South Africa: Applying Section 307 of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act to Goods Produced by Black South Africans, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 421,
432-33 (1987) (noting that "in light of the scarcity of jobs and depressed economic conditions of
the homelands" blacks must choose "between accepting a job with inhumane working conditions"
and being unable to support their families).
20031 663
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
framework of institutions within which particular activities flourish or
fail.
Part VII considers the appropriate level of precaution when
risks are not devastating. It argues that, when risks are fully
compensable and therefore rectifiable after the fact, fairness is
compatible with efficient precaution. When risks are fully
compensable, fairness can be done by redistribution after the fact of
injury. Efficient precaution is appropriate because it maximizes the
size of the pie at society's disposal, thereby making money available to
achieve a fair distribution of burden and benefit, among other things.
II. DEVASTATING INJURY AND FAIR PRECAUTION
A. Fairness and Comparability: The Moral Case for More-than-Cost-
Justified Precaution Against Devastating Injury
Cost-benefit analysis draws on the idea of preference,
crystallized in dollars.26 Yet preference does not seem to get at the
moral nerve of the problem with which these statutes grapple. That
problem is defined by four characteristics. First, these standards
typically apply to toxins and carcinogens which threaten devastating
injury-injury which is severe and irreparable. The injuries risked are
severe, because they threaten to bring life to a premature close or to
impair normal physical functioning seriously, in the way that diseases
like brown lung disease do. 27 They are irreparable because the harm
26. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 368-69 (1991):
I adopt the consumer sovereignty position that consumer welfare is to be judged solely
by reference to consumers' own tastes and preferences. I also assume that those tastes
and preferences can be meaningfully translated into a dollar amount and that the
appropriate amount is whatever each consumer is willing to pay to satisfy those
preferences.
Kaplow and Shavell make essentially these assumptions. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra
note 19, at 88 n.5 (indicating that "the importance of liberty to an individual" should be
"determined by the amount by which the individual values it"); id. at 100 n.32 (endorsing "the
convention of placing a dollar value on harm" as a way of measuring "the implicit valuations of
individuals reflected in the choices they make"); see also Keating, supra note 7, at 334-35 nn.78,
81.
27. Inhalation of cotton dust, for example, can lead to byssinosis, or "brown lung" disease.
Byssinosis is a "continuum... disease," categorized into four grades. These are:
[Grade] V2 : slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; no evidence of chronic
ventilatory impairment. [Grade] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity;
no evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment; [Grade] 2: evidence of slight to
moderate irreversible impairment of ventilatory capacity; [Grade] 3: evidence of
moderate to severe irreversible impairment of ventilatory capacity.
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that these injuries inflict cannot be undone; normal functioning and
normal life cannot be restored. Second, the injuries to which these
standards apply are avoidable. No one need suffer brown lung disease
if we are prepared to forgo milling cotton; no one need die from the
effects of lifetime occupational exposure to benzene if we are prepared
to forgo refining petroleum.
Third, the category of activity which produces these risks is one
which society cannot avoid if it is to reproduce itself and which
individual members of society cannot usually avoid if they are to lead
decent lives. Unlike other kinds of activities-recreational activities,
for example-basic productive activities are largely inescapable.
Growing crops, milling cotton, and refining petroleum are activities
that are essential to the reproduction of society. We may individually
forgo eating certain foods, wearing cotton clothes, or consuming
petroleum products, but our society as a whole cannot realistically
forgo growing and consuming crops, refining and consuming benzene,
and milling and wearing cotton. Conversely, working-earning a
living-is, for most of those who mill cotton and refine benzene, an
unavoidable activity which meets an urgent need. Other things being
equal, the less that activities are avoidable and the more urgent the
needs they meet, the more important it is that they be conducted on
fair terms. 28 Fourth, the risks governed by these standards are certain
to ripen into some incidence of the harms risked. The activities
governed by these standards-growing crops, milling cotton, refining
petroleum-are sufficiently large in their scope and sufficiently
extended in time that there is no longer just a chance that the harms
risked by conducting these activities will occur; there is certainty that
such harm will occur. The only questions are how many injuries will
be inflicted and who will suffer them.
The infliction of certain premature death and crippling disease
on even a handful of people raises the question: What sort of gains to
some people justify inflicting devastating injuries-including death-
on other people? Not just any gain will do. It is unfair to make a few
suffer devastating injury so that many may reap trivial benefits.
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 496 n.8 (1981). An estimated 100,000
employed and retired cotton workers suffer from the disease, with an estimated 35,000 (or one
out of every twelve) suffering from grade three, the worst and most disabling form of the disease.
See id. at 490, 496-98. Following Lewis Sargentich's usage in KEETON ET AL., TORT AND
ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 956, I shall refer to this case as "The Cotton Dust Case."
28. Modern assumption of risk doctrine is responsive to considerations of avoidability and
urgency. With the exception of the "firefighters' rule," the modern form of the defense finds its
fullest expression in the context of recreational activities. Conversely, the defense has largely
been abolished in the workplace context. See KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra
note 14, at 321-46.
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Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has toppled and
crushed a television technician helping to broadcast an episode of
"Baywatch" to a billion viewers worldwide, 29 and that the only way to
save the technician's life is to interrupt the broadcast for thirty
minutes, effectively thwarting the transmission of the show on this
particular evening. Although the number of viewers may be vast, the
harm to them is not morally comparable to the life of the technician.
Inconvenience and disappointment are not morally comparable to
death. No amount of inconvenience-distributed across a large
number of distinct persons-sums to the loss of a single life. We
therefore should not decide how to proceed by measuring the victim's
preference for having her life saved in the dollars that she would pay
to save it and by comparing that sum to the dollars that the viewers
would pay to have the broadcast continue. The cost to the technician
and the benefit to the viewers are not fungible at some ratio of
exchange.
Death, or even devastation, is not essential to this example.
The harms involved would not be comparable even if the harm to the
technician were not death, or even devastation as I have defined it,
but severe injury-thirty minutes of excruciating pain which left no
long-term physical traces, for example. The gains and losses on the
opposite sides of the equation-the inconvenience and disappointment
of missing a favorite television show on the one side and suffering
thirty minutes of excruciating pain on the other-are still not
comparable in the havoc they wreak in the lives of those they affect.
They are not comparable in their urgency.30 No amount of viewer
29. I am adapting slightly an example used by Tim Scanlon. See T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE TO EACH OTHER 235 (1998) (using the World Cup soccer tournament as an example).
Nothing in the example hinges on the "low cultural value" of "Baywatch." One may substitute a
show of higher cultural value, but it will have a smaller audience.
30. The argument of fairness advanced here rests not on ideas of preference but on ideas of
urgency, or need. On the contrast generally, see Thomas M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72
J. PHIL. 665 (1975). Scanlon writes that interpersonal comparisons based on considerations of
urgency represent "the best available standard of justification that is mutually acceptable to
people whose preferences diverge." See also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of
Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17 (Jon Elster &
John E. Roemer eds., 1991). In these papers Scanlon characterizes urgency- or need-based
approaches to interpersonal comparison as "objective" (in contrast to "subjective") approaches. In
a later paper, Scanlon characterizes urgency-based approaches to interpersonal comparison as
one kind of "substantive goods" approach. See Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire and Quality of Life,
in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). For our purposes,
the contrast between urgency- and preference-based approaches can be understood in either way.
John Rawls's idea of "primary goods" and Amartya Sen's idea of "basic capabilities" are examples
of approaches to interpersonal comparison which take fundamental needs or interests as the
proper basis of comparison. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 187-90; AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
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disappointment and inconvenience-no number of disappointed and
inconvenienced viewers-can justify letting the technician suffer
thirty minutes of excruciating pain, much less die. Matters would be
different only if the harms on either side of the equation were
comparable, if we were somehow forced to choose between inflicting
death on some and quadriplegia on others, for example. Quadriplegia
and death are comparable to one another. Both devastate the lives of
those they affect. If we must choose between risking quadriplegia to
some and death to others, we must consider the number of persons
affected.
These intuitive judgments of comparability reflect a general
idea. Harms are comparable when their impact on the lives of those
they affect is similarly grave-when they impair ordinary activities,
important activities, or the pursuit of rational life plans, in similarly
severe ways. Harms are comparable when they strike at the
preconditions of rational agency in similarly severe (or similarly mild)
ways. Harms are comparable when they disrupt the lives of those they
affect in similarly urgent (or similarly insignificant) ways. Burdens
and benefits are comparable when they improve or impair lives in
similarly important or modest ways. When burdens and benefits are
comparable, they may, other things being equal, be traded off against
one another. When they are not comparable it is unfair-unjust-to
trade them off against one another. Trading grave injuries for trivial
benefits sacrifices the essential interests of some for the sake of
inessential gains by others. Justice forbids this kind of sacrifice.
This conclusion-that not just any gain, no matter how trivial,
justifies inflicting death or devastating injury on someone, so long as
the trivial gains sum to a large enough value-rests at bottom on
considerations of fairness. Fairness has to do with the distribution of
benefits and burdens.31 It is "concerned . . .with how well each
person's claim is satisfied compared with how well other people's are
satisfied."32 Just as it is unfair for an enterprise to leave the financial
costs of its nonnegligent accidents concentrated on the unlucky few
who happen to be victims of those accidents while others reap the
benefits of the enterprise's activity, 33 it is also unfair to devastate a
REEXAMINED 39-42, 49 (1992). I explain the way in which the approach pursued in this paper
uses urgency-based, or "objective" criteria of interpersonal comparison infra Part II.B
31. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 21, at 87-102.
32. Id. at 95.
33. This argument of fairness lies at the heart of an important case for preferring
enterprise liability over negligence liability. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the
Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1266, 1273 (1997). This idea of fairness is
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few for the sake of trivial gains to others.34 Fairness requires that we
inflict devastating injury on some only for the sake of comparable
gains (or to avoid comparable losses) to others.
The idea of fairness thus directs our attention to a distinct
domain of concerns, a domain different from that of either efficiency or
rights. In the class of cases that occupy us, fairness is concerned with
the distribution of burdens and benefits among distinct persons.
Efficiency, by contrast, directs our attention to questions of welfare or
well-being-to questions of what John Broome calls "absolute
satisfaction."35  Death-the most severe form of irreparable injury-
presents efficiency analysis with an exceedingly difficult question of
valuation: 36 "What is it worth," Thomas Schelling asks, "to reduce the
probability of death... within some identifiable group of people none
of whom expects to die except eventually?" 37 The answer hinges,
Schelling argues, on what the affected individuals would pay to reduce
the probability. For Schelling, the problem is essentially a question of
individual valuation. Fairness, in the sense that concerns us, is
inherently relational and interpersonal: What kinds of gains to some
are sufficiently important to justify inflicting accidental death on
others?
The contrast between fairness and rights is equally sharp.
Rights allocate control over various decisions. They identify domains
within which individuals are able to decide what to do "without any
vividly expressed in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.).
34. See Sargentich, "Fairness and Feasibility," KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra
note 14, at 20-6 to 20-7:
[The] same idea of fairness that provides a rationale for enterprise liability [also
justifies feasible risk reduction]. According to this conception, it is unfair to impose
the burden of one's profitable activity on another, while reaping the benefit oneself; it
is unfair to rig a common activity so that some bear its burdens while others reap its
benefits.
Cf. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 111-12 (When "a number of persons engage in a mutually
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways
necessary to yield advantages for all," a "principle of fairness" applies and requires each
participant to do her part and accept an appropriate share of the scheme's burdens and
benefits.).
35. Broome, supra note 21 (noting that fairness "is concerned only with relative satisfaction
not absolute satisfaction"). Broome makes his point in a language that appears to assume a
subjective metric of interpersonal comparison. But the point is independent of the choice of a
metric of interpersonal comparison.
36. Cass Sunstein has suggested to me that economists are likely to see only a problem of
undervaluation of certain harms here.
37. Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE, supra note 19, at 113. When it was first published in 1968, Schelling's article
inaugurated the modern economic approach to the valuation of human life.
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coercive interference by or on behalf of society. s38 Whereas fairness
directs our attention to questions of cost and comparability-to
whether "the game is worth the candle"-assignments of rights tend to
exclude considerations of cost from our deliberations. When someone
has been granted a right to control a certain domain-the domain of
their own conscience, dress, or political associations, for example-the
cost of providing that control has already been found worthwhile.
When a claim is framed as a claim of right, considerations of costs and
benefits recede from view. 39 When a claim is framed as a claim of
(distributive) fairness, by contrast, the very question framed is one of
"costs" and "benefits." Are the benefits to some worth the burdens to
others that is their price?
When risks of devastating injury are at stake, fairness finds
fault with the metric of valuation on which cost-benefit analysis
typically draws. Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis rejects the idea
that harms and benefits differ qualitatively and the companion idea
that harms must be comparable in value before they can sensibly be
traded off against one another. Cost-benefit analysis typically40 takes
preference as its touchstone and cashes preference out in dollars,
41
thereby assuming "that all human interests are commensurable, and
that between any two there always exists some rate of exchange in
terms of which it is rational to balance the protection of one against
the protection of the other . ... ,42 In its unrestricted and most
characteristic form, cost-benefit analysis assumes that everything is
38. Compare Brian Barry, Lady Chatterly's Lover and Doctor Fisher's Bomb Party:
Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 11, 15 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986), with T.M. Scanlon,
Rights, Goals and Fairness in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 93 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978)
(distinguishing fairness and rights from each other and from welfare).
39. In his Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, Cass Sunstein describes some of the statutory
standards considered in this Article as "fueled by the notion that a safe workplace, or clean air
and water, should be treated as involving a right to be vindicated rather than a risk to be
managed." 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 413-14 (1990). To the extent that Professor Sunstein is
claiming that the safety and feasibility standards discussed in this Article are justified by a
claim of moral right-and wrongly so, because the language of rights precludes adequate
consideration of costs and benefits-this Article is at least in partial conflict with the claim. I
agree that the conceptual apparatus of "rights talk" tends to exclude considerations of cost from
consideration. But I disagree that claims of moral right provide the justification for the safety
and feasibility standards. I believe that these standards are best justified by arguments of
fairness. Fairness is all about the relation between burdens and benefits.
40. For one prominent exception, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in VALUES AT RISK,
supra note 19, at 94. For examples of preference-based approaches, see supra note 26.
41. See supra note 26.
42. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 312.
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fungible at some ratio of exchange. 43 In the case of the injured
television technician, unrestricted cost-benefit analysis allows the
disappointment and inconvenience of the viewers to outweigh the
death or agony of the technician. If the preferences of a small number
of viewers for the continued broadcast of "Baywatch" are intense
enough (and if those viewers have the resources to back their
preferences with an appropriate amount of money), or if a large
enough number of viewers have even mild preferences for continued
broadcast of the show, letting the technician die or suffer agonizing
pain may be both the wealth-maximizing and the utility-maximizing
course of action. Yet this outcome is morally grotesque. The
disappointment and inconvenience of the viewers is simply not urgent
enough to compete with the death or the agony of the technician.
The existence of discontinuities of value-the fact that not
everything is comparable in value to undevastated human life-gives
us reason not to fix the appropriate level of precaution against risks of
devastating injury by applying the standard of cost-justification.
Inflicting death and devastating injury on some person or class of
persons is only justified if doing so realizes some comparable value,
some equally urgent benefit to some other person or class of persons. It
is unfair to inflict even one death for the sake of trivial gains to others,
no matter how numerous those others may be, and it is equally unfair
to devastate even one person so that many people may reap trivial
benefits. 44 Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with
these convictions. Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis assumes that a
sufficient quantity of any value, no matter how trivial that value may
be qualitatively speaking, will suffice to justify devastating some
human life. This assumption of universal comparability is mistaken.
The idea of comparable value provides a reason for moving
beyond the point of cost-justified precaution (beyond the point of
maximal benefit economically conceived) and explains why we might
sometimes insist that risks be reduced to the safe or insignificant level
43. My point here is a conceptual one: Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis aims to compare
all costs and benefits and counts them fungible at some ratio of exchange. In practice, cost-
benefit analysis rarely, if ever, reaches as far. The practical application of cost-benefit analysis
requires making choices about how widely to cast the net of "cost" and "benefit." On this, see
KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 955-56 (distinguishing between
"focussed" and "plenary" cost-benefit analysis). "The distinction has to do with how many factors
are placed in the cost-benefit scales and weighed against one another." Id. at 955.
44. In practice, it may not be possible to protect single individuals. We may have to
evaluate practices of risk imposition by estimating their impacts on representative persons. See
infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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and other times insist only that risks be reduced to the feasible level. 45
Reducing risks of devastating injury beyond the point of maximal
benefit (economically conceived) is justified when the potential gains
are not morally comparable to the death or devastation that is their
price. Reducing risks of devastating injury to the point where they are
insignificant-the demand of safety-based regulation-is justified
when the benefits of bearing a significant risk of devastating injury
are not comparable, morally speaking, to the burdens. Reducing risks
of devastating injury to the extent feasible without crippling the
beneficial activity which generates the risks-the demand of
feasibility analysis-is justified when crippling the activity in question
would work a harm comparable to bearing a significant risk of
devastating injury. Reducing risks only so far as feasible is fair when
the long-run flourishing of the activity to which the risks belong is a
good morally comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury.
Considerations of comparable value are not the only reasons we
have to believe that the acceptability of some risk impositions should
not be settled by appealing to the standard of cost-justification. When
we are considering the burdens and benefits of some risk imposition
(or some practice of risk imposition), we should be concerned with the
actual burdens borne by those affected by the risky practice at issue,
not with maximizing the total values involved.46 Maximizing total
utility is misguided even if one accepts utility as the appropriate unit
of value, because what counts is the utility experienced by each
sentient being and total utility is experienced by no one. 47 Maximizing
wealth-the practice recommended by cost-benefit analysis-is
misguided for the same reason. No single person reaps all of the
benefits and bears all of the burdens of any social practice. The sum of
those benefits minus those burdens is therefore an unreliable guide to
the actual gains and losses of the persons affected by the practice.
The failings of cost-benefit analysis in this respect echo the
failings of classical utilitarianism. Like classical utilitarianism, cost-
45. In general, cost-justified precaution is less protective of safety than feasible precaution,
and feasible precaution is less protective than safe precaution is-but not always. Feasible
precaution will be less protective of safety than cost-justified precaution when it is not cost-
justified to engage in an activity in the first place. See infra text accopmanying notes 172-79.
46. See SCANLON, supra note 29, at 229-41.
47. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 22, at 140:
[When population is subject to change ... [the principle of maximizing total utility] . .
. entails that so long as the average utility per person falls slowly enough when the
number of individuals increases, the population should be encouraged to grow
indefinitely no matter how low the average has fallen.., the sum of utilities added by
the greater number of persons is sufficiently great to make up for the decline in the




benefit analysis fails to "take seriously the distinction between
persons."48 It aggregates incommensurable benefits and burdens
across persons. It therefore makes the permissibility of various
practices of risk imposition turn on the total value involved instead of
the actual burdens and benefits borne by those affected by the
practices in question, and it therefore permits trivial gains to many to
justify devastating harms to a few. Avoiding these mistakes requires
that we attend to both the commensurability of the costs and benefits
being compared and the actual distribution of those burdens.
When significant risks of devastating injury are involved, both
considerations of comparability and attention to the distribution of
benefit and burden suggest reasons why we may wish to press
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification. Concern with
comparability should make us wary of taking only cost-justified
precaution, because unrestricted cost-benefit analysis fixes the point
of cost-justified precaution by counting costs and benefits that are not
comparable to devastating injury in its calculus of value. It is
therefore likely to overstate the benefits of devastating injury.
Concern with the actual distribution of burdens and benefits among
those affected should likewise lead us to be wary of cost-justified
precaution. When significant risks of physical injury ripen into death
and incurable disease, the benefits of going beyond the cost-justified
level of precaution (and the burdens of failing to do so) are measured
in terms of lives saved and incurable diseases avoided. To those who
reap them, these are invaluable benefits. The distributed costs of
going beyond the cost-justified point of precaution, by contrast, may
well be small-perhaps very small-losses to large numbers of people.
If we set the permissible level of chemical residue on fresh produce
below the cost-justified level, for example, farmers may be unable to
extract as much yield per acre of crop. 49 They may forgo profit, and
consumers may pay higher prices as a result. Demanding that they
forgo these profits, and that consumers pay slightly higher prices, may
nonetheless be fair. No farmer, no farm laborer, and no consumer will
die or acquire a devastating and incurable disease. They may each
suffer no more than imperceptible losses, and none will suffer a loss
comparable to death.
The fact that a particular level of pesticide residue on produce,
or a particular level of benzene or cotton dust in a workplace,
48. See id. at 24.
49. Pesticide residue on agricultural products is one setting for the application of safety-
based regulation. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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maximizes the wealth that society extracts from the activity at issue
does not supply those who stand to lose their health or their lives with
good reason to accept the level of risk that efficiency licenses. Society
is extracting maximum advantage from the activity by putting them
in peril of great and readily avoidable harm. If the sacrifice demanded
of them might be avoided without imposing a comparable sacrifice on
anyone else, the risk should be reduced. When avoiding great sacrifice
on the part of a few requires only minor sacrifices on the part of many,
many should make minor sacrifices. It is only fair to inflict
devastating injuries on a few when the cost of avoiding those injuries
is at least comparable to the cost of the injuries themselves.
The economic argument that it is irrational to press precaution
beyond the point of cost-justification-because doing so will make
everyone worse off-therefore rests on both an inadequate metric of
interpersonal comparison and insufficient attention to the actual
distribution of burdens and benefits. The metric of comparison is
flawed because it treats the devastation of some as comparable to the
receipt of trivial benefits by others-even though the two are not
morally comparable. The focus on aggregate well-being is wrong
because the economic surplus realized by taking only cost-justified
precaution cannot be used to restore the lives or the health of those
devastated by cost-justified risks.50 No one experiences aggregate well-
being, and death and devastation are beyond rectification by
redistribution.
When attention to overall well-being licenses a level of risk
imposition that devastates some for the sake of trivial gains to others,
irreparable injustice is done. Redistribution of the wealth saved by not
pressing precaution further will not make those who have been killed
and devastated better off than they would have been had their death
and devastation been avoided. They have been harmed beyond the
power of redistribution to repair. When attention to overall well-being
licenses a level of risk imposition that devastates some for the sake of
trivial gains to others, the claim that cost-justified precaution makes
50. The argument that it is better to redistribute a surplus maximized by adopting the legal
rule recommended by welfare economics than to effect a desirable distribution through the choice
of a different rule ab initio is essential to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's claim that
"individuals will be made worse off overall whenever consideration of fairness leads to the choice
of a regime different from that which would be adopted under welfare economics .... " See
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 33-34 (footnotes omitted) ("[D]istributional objectives can
often be best accomplished directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) programs . ...
[R]edistribution through legal rules entails both the inefficiency of redistribution generally (due




everyone better off than they would otherwise be rings hollow. 51 Well-
being accrues to actual persons. Pressing precaution beyond the point
of cost-justification will confer great benefits on some at the cost of
trivial losses to others. Each person who benefits will gain far more
than each person who loses. When pressing precaution beyond the
point of cost-justification confers great benefits on some at the cost of
only trivial losses to others, doing so is not only fair, it is also desirable
insofar as well-being itself is of primary concern.
B. Fairness and Risk
Cost-benefit analysis emerges from the value-maximizing
framework of economic thought. Its particular conception of value as
the rational satisfaction of subjective preferences expressed in dollars
connects it to the utilitarian tradition in political philosophy. The
criticisms of cost-benefit analysis that this Article has voiced sound in
fairness. The fact that these criticisms can be presented directly-
without invoking any particular intellectual framework-testifies to
the fact that the idea of fairness is a part of our shared moral
vocabulary. But these criticisms draw implicitly on a particular
conception of fairness, and that conception does emerge from a
particular intellectual tradition-namely, the social contract tradition
in political philosophy, broadly conceived. So we need both to make
our conception of fairness more specific and to explain the intellectual
framework from which it emerges.
The variant of the social contract tradition on which I shall
draw conceives of persons as both rational and reasonable, with their
rationality being conceived in a way which differs from the conception
embedded in cost-benefit analysis. Persons are taken to be rational by
virtue of their capacity to govern their actions in accordance with
reason, of course, but reason is understood not just instrumentally-as
the ability to determine how best to satisfy independently given
preferences-but also practically-as the capacity to determine that
certain reasons, purposes, ends, or preferences are worth acting on.52
51. Death and devastating injury thus pose special problems for Kaplow and Shavell's claim
that efficient precaution always makes everyone better off. When the repeated imposition of a
justified risk is certain to result in at least one person's death, it is impossible to make "everyone
better off." The person who dies is not made better off by his own untimely death. Risk
impositions which result in death can be to the ex ante advantage of those they kill, but they do
not make those they kill "better off." Ex ante advantage and actual well-being are different
matters. See John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 95 (1978).
52. The idea of practical reason goes back to Aristotle, who understood it to be concerned
with the proper ends of human life. More generally, practical reason is reason concerned with
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This capacity for "critically reflective, rational self-governance" 53 gives
rise to a fundamental human interest in freedom-in being free to
govern one's life in accordance with one's own value judgments.
Our fundamental interest in shaping our own lives means that
we have an enormous stake in living within institutions that provide
us with favorable circumstances for making our lives answer to our
aspirations for them. Our capacity to realize our ends is deeply
affected by the institutions within which we live, and deeply
dependent on the cooperative efforts of others. 54 Our natural habitat is
not Robinson Crusoe's isolation on his island, but rather the society of
others, whose cooperation in sustaining a common economy, society,
and politics is essential to our own well-being and even to our ability
to realize our particular ends. It is our capacity for reasonableness
which makes cooperation with others on fair terms possible. We are
reasonable agents by virtue of our sense of justice, our capacity for fair
social cooperation with other free and equal, rational and reasonable
persons. We have not just the capacity to cooperate with each other
and to treat each other fairly, but also the fundamental interest in
living together on terms of equal freedom and mutual respect. 55 Terms
of equal freedom and respect express our fundamental moral status as
free and equal persons.
To make our lives answer to our aspirations for them we need,
among other things, a substantial measure of security--of freedom
from accidental injury and death at the hands of others. John Stuart
Mill remarked,
Security no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity
from evil and the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment, since
action and judgment oriented towards action. It contrasts both with theoretical reason, which is
concerned with understanding, and with instrumental reason, which is concerned with the
realization of ends taken as given (with the effective pursuit of independently given ends). See
THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 728 (Robert Audi gen'l ed., 2d ed. 1999); THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 287, 296 (Simon Blackburn ed., 1994).
53. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 149, 175 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988).
54. The idea that, as Annette Baier puts it, "morality is a cooperative scheme" is not
peculiar to views with a Kantian flavor. It is also, Baier asserts, endorsed by Mill and Hume
among others. For Hume, morality is a "conjunction of forces"; for Mill, a "joining to make safe
the very groundwork of our existence." This idea of moral obligation as cooperative "all the way
down," so to speak, is rejected by libertarian views. See Baier, supra note 20, at 56-61, 57.
55. If the conception of society and morality as cooperative ventures sets Kantian liberalism
apart from libertarianism, a commitment to equal freedom and mutual respect unites Kantian
liberalism with more libertarian conceptions. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 28-29
(1978).
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nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us if we could be
deprived of everything the next instant.
5 6
Our need for security, however, is only half the story. We also need a
substantial measure of liberty-of freedom to put others at risk of
physical harm in pursuit of our own ends-if we are to lead our own
lives in accordance with our aspirations for them. When we act we put
others at peril, even if only very slightly and even when we act with
appropriate caution. If we cannot put others at peril-cannot
endanger their security-we cannot act and so cannot pursue our ends
and lead our lives. Maximal security extinguishes liberty, and
maximal liberty extinguishes security. Yet substantial measures of
both liberty and security are essential if we are to have the chance to
make our lives answer to our aspirations. 57 Liberty and security are
both essential conditions of effective rational agency. This is the
dilemma at the heart of accident law. 58
When the law of accidents licenses the imposition of a risk, it
enhances the freedom of some and imperils the security of others.
Those who impose the risk are free to pursue ends and activities that
they value, and their pursuit exposes others to risks of physical harm.
When the law of accidents forbids the imposition of some risk, it does
the reverse-it curbs the freedom of prospective injurers and enhances
the security of potential victims. Risk impositions thus pit the liberty
of injurers against the security of victims, and the law of accidents
56. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 53 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1861).
57. Although this conception of the problem of accidental harm has its roots in the social
contract tradition in political theory, especially as articulated by John Rawls, "liberty" and
"security" in the sense used here do not identify "primary goods" lexically superior to income and
wealth in the manner of the liberties covered by Rawls's first principle of justice. "Liberty" and
"security" are general cover terms designed to characterize, at a fairly high level of generality,
the stakes in accidental risk imposition. The burdens and benefits of risk include increases and
losses in wealth and income, so there is no question of these freedoms being lexically prior to the
primary goods of wealth and income. Thus, in judging the reasonableness of various risk
impositions or liability rules, we should assess the significance of gains and losses in wealth and
income in terms of their impacts on liberty and security.
58. It is possible to accept this account of the interests at stake in accidental risk
impositions from an economic perspective. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 138:
In the context of nonconsensual risky interactions, entitlements embody the legal
resolution of how conflicting liberty and security interests should be mediated.
Potential injurers have liberty interests in pursuing risky behavior that imposes risks
on others, whereas potential victims have interests in their bodily security. The
interests of the two parties conflict.
By accepting entitlements to liberty and security as its starting point, Geistfeld's approach
breaks with purely welfarist approaches within economics such as that taken by KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 15-16. But Geistfeld's approach to the problem of irreparable injury
also differs fundamentally from the approach taken in this Article, because it uses cost-benefit
analysis to determine the appropriate weighting of the security and liberty interests.
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sets the terms on which these competing freedoms are reconciled. The
task of the law of accidents is to reconcile liberty and security on
terms that are both favorable and fair. Favorable terms provide
advantageous conditions for people to pursue their ends, aims, and
aspirations. The most favorable terms (if they exist) reconcile security
and liberty in the unique way which provides the most auspicious
terms for people to shape their lives in accordance with their
aspirations. Fair terms reconcile the competing claims of liberty and
security in ways that advantage even those they most disadvantage.
Each of us must individually judge how best to reconcile the
pursuit of activities we value with the physical and psychological
integrity that those activities can jeopardize. What ends are worth the
risks they entail? Are the risks of death and disfigurement that are
the price of scaling Mount Everest worth the sense of accomplishment
that comes from standing on its summit? Are increased risks of cancer
worth bearing as the price of performing pathbreaking medical
research? Are increased risks of cancer worth bearing as the price of
earning a living?
These questions of individual choice, however, differ
fundamentally from the parallel questions of social choice. Individual
choice is the domain of rationality, whereas social choice is the domain
of reasonableness. The rationality of exposing oneself to a risk
depends on the importance that one attaches to the end furthered by
the exposure and the efficacy with which the exposure will further
those values. The canons of rationality thus give wide rein to
individual subjectivity and are naturally expressed in the language of
efficiency. Individuals are free to value the burdens and benefits of
risks by any metric they choose, and it is natural for them to value
burdens and benefits by their own subjective criteria of well-being. It
is also rational for individuals to run risks whenever, by their own
lights, the expected benefits of so doing exceed the expected costs, and
to decline to run risks whenever the expected costs exceed the
benefits. It is not, however, reasonable for people to expose others to
risks whenever-by the potential injurer's own criteria of value-the
benefits of imposing the risk exceed the burdens of having to bear
exposure to it.
Why does the rationality of risk imposition not guarantee its
reasonableness? The circumstance in which we voluntarily expose
ourselves to risks in the pursuit of our own ends is very different from
the circumstance in which others involuntarily expose us to risks in
the pursuit of their ends. The lives of different people cannot be
collapsed into a single life that reaps both the burdens and the
benefits of rational risk impositions, and the diverse aims and
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aspirations of a set of free and equal people cannot be converted into a
single scale which enables us to judge collectively as we do
individually. In a world of distinct persons who affirm diverse and
incommensurable conceptions of the ends worth pursuing over the
course of a human life, there is no reason to assume that those who
are put at risk value the ends pursued through the relevant risk
impositions in the way that those imposing the risks do. The fact that
you are prepared to run enormous risks for the advancement of
medical knowledge does not mean that I am prepared to do so. The
fact that I might be prepared to run enormous risks to scale K2
without oxygen does not mean that you are prepared to do so.
The difference between individual and social choice
undermines the argument that a risk should be borne because it
pursues a worthy end at an acceptable cost. Given the reasonable
diversity of persons' aims and aspirations, the justification for
accepting risk impositions by others is not common acknowledgment
of some shared final end, but mutuality of benefit. It is reasonable to
expose other people to risks of serious injury and even death when it is
fair to do so; and it is fair to do so when they also stand to gain, ex
ante and over time, from the imposition of those risks. Prospective
victims may benefit from the imposition of risks upon them in either of
two ways. First, victims may benefit because-ex ante and over a
reasonable span of time-they will gain from the reciprocal right to
expose others to equal risks. The right to impose risks on others can
justify the imposition of equal risks on us by others, because, for
example, we may each gain more than we lose from having to bear the
risks created by the presence of other cars on the road. When potential
injurers are also potential victims, and equally so, a "community of
risk" is present and in its strongest form. Within a "community of
risk," practices of risk imposition are fair if and when they are to the
advantage of a representative member of the community. They are to
the advantage of a representative member of the community when the
liberty that she gains from the right to impose the relevant risks is
more valuable to her than the security she loses from having to bear
exposure to equivalent risk impositions at the hands of others. Each
member of the community then has her security compromised by
having to bear risks imposed by others, but each also has her liberty
enhanced by the ability to impose risk on others. When the gains to
each person's freedom outweigh the losses to each person's liberty, the
imposition of risk benefits each member of the community. When this
criterion is met, no one's life or limb is sacrificed to the greater good of
others, and each member of the community has better life prospects
[Vol. 56:653678
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than she would if the practice of imposing the risk in question were
forbidden.
The second kind of case may be illustrated by the practice of
transporting large quantities of gasoline over the roads by tanker
trailer. Given the importance of driving to our daily lives, we may all
benefit from this method of transportation, even though it creates
risks of massive explosion, and even though most of us never expect to
make use of the legal right to transport gasoline in this manner.59
Even residents of Manhattan, who may drive so infrequently that they
gain far less than residents of Los Angeles do from this method of
transporting gasoline, still may gain from the practice. 60 Their life
prospects may be better by virtue of the prosperity created and
sustained by the practice of transporting gasoline by tractor trailer,
than they would be if that practice were prohibited. If so, the practice
is to their advantage, and the risks it imposes upon them are fair.
When risks are not imposed within a community of risk-when a
discernible group bears more of the burden or garners less of the
benefit of some practice of risk imposition-practices of risk imposition
are fair when they work to the greatest long-run advantage of a
representative member of the class of those most disadvantaged by the
practice of risk imposition.61
In both of these circumstances-driving in general and
transporting gasoline by tanker trailer in particular-some people
exposed to the risky practice will suffer devastating injury, including
59. The transport of gasoline in this manner precipitated the death of the plaintiffs
decedent in Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1182-83 (Wash. 1972).
60. It is tempting to think that they are also exposed to proportionately less risk from this
practice of transporting gasoline so that their lesser benefit is matched by lesser burden. But it is
not clear to me that they are at much less risk from the practice. Tractor-trailers towing gasoline
may create risks of especially great harm in the confined quarters and crowded spaces of
Manhattan, even if there are fewer of them. The risks posed by tractor-trailers hauling gasoline
may not diminish commensurately with the frequency of tractor-trailer trips.
61. In an early use of Rawlsian ideas in legal theory, Frank Michelman proposes a similar
criterion for determining when compensation should be granted for a "taking' under the just
compensation clause.
A decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the disappointed claimant ought
to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which
holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent
practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision.
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1223 (1967). In "Fairness and Feasibility," in
KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-6 to 20-11 and "Rawlsian Fairness," id.
at 20-11 to 20-12, Lewis Sargentich advances a fairness justification for feasible risk reduction.
That justification owes much to Rawls and explicitly analogizes feasible risk reduction to the
difference principle. This Article seeks both to build on Michelman's and Sargentich's fairness
arguments and to incorporate the general Rawlsian idea of fairness that they articulate into the
framework sketched in this section.
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death. Over time, some people will reap the benefits of letting these
risks be imposed, and others will bear the burdens. Because
devastating risks are not fully compensable, the actual gains of those
who win cannot be used to repair the harm done to those who lose,
making the practices to the actual advantage of everyone they affect.
Devastating losses will be concentrated on an unlucky class of victims.
Over time, then, practices of devastating risk imposition must work to
the severe disadvantage of some of those they affect. What can be said
by way of justification to those who lose? The only answer is that the
relevant practices of risk imposition were to their ex ante advantage
and that their lives and limbs were not, therefore, sacrificed either to
the general good, or to the lesser interests of others. There was no
alternate way of reconciling liberty and security which would have
improved their life prospects, and perhaps have avoided their
devastation, without working a greater hardship on another class of
persons.
More particularly, in the case of a "community of risk," we can
say that there was no reconciliation of these two conditions of rational
agency which would have improved the prospects of a representative
member of the community ex ante (and so would have improved the
circumstances of at least a few members ex post). In the case of a
practice which puts some in particular peril, we can say that there
was no reconciliation of these two essential conditions of rational
agency that would have improved the prospects of those most
disadvantaged by the reconciliation at issue, without imposing a
greater disadvantage on a comparable class of those affected by the
practice. When these criteria of ex ante advantage are met, the actual
distribution of winners and losers will be more favorable than any
alternate arrangement, but some will still lose, and lose devastatingly.
The only consolation is that their lives were not taken unfairly.
To count for something important, ex ante advantage must, in
general, turn into actual benefit, which raises the question of time:
How soon must the actual benefit accrue? Much depends upon context,
but the outer limit of a reasonable time period is generally the course
of a normal life. The life prospects of those who are asked to bear the
risks licensed by some practice of risk imposition are usually the
longest reasonable touchstone of advantage. Were we to choose a
longer touchstone, those disadvantaged by a particular practice of risk
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imposition could not expect to reap the benefits of the risk impositions
at issue.62
Discussion of advantage and disadvantage requires criteria of
interpersonal comparison. Questions of interpersonal comparison-of
comparable value-are at the heart of the objections that we have
voiced to fixing the level of precaution against risks of death and
devastating injury by cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis
makes interpersonal comparisons of well-being by deploying a
subjective conception of well-being. Benefit and burden are measured
by inquiring into the preferences, as expressed in dollars, of those
affected by the risk impositions at issue. The unrestricted use of
subjective preference (whether or not it is expressed in dollars) is
objectionable because it compares harms-death and inconvenience,
for example-which are not comparable, morally speaking, and
permits a sufficient quantity of trivial benefit to justify some
irreparable injury.63 Harms must be comparable in urgency and in the
benefit or injury they work on the lives of those they affect before they
may be traded against one another. The idea of subjective preference
satisfaction expressed in dollars underlies cost-benefit analysis: What
competing ideas underlie our discussion of urgency and moral
comparability? How do these relate to "liberty" and "security"?
The idea that life should be sacrificed only for something of
comparable value is a considered moral judgment which is not so
much the product of a moral or political theory as data for it. So, too, is
the judgment that it is unfair to sacrifice one person's life to avoid
inconveniencing millions of other people. But these judgments of
comparability and fairness, like other considered judgments, invite
theorizing. We do not know, intuitively, what these judgments imply
in the way of criteria for permissible risk imposition, where the risks
at question issue in irreparable injury. We therefore have reason to
search for and articulate principles which can make sense of these
judgments and guide our thinking in other cases. Social contract
theory makes general sense of these judgments by supposing that
judgments of comparable value must be based on objective criteria of
interpersonal comparison, criteria whose touchstone is urgency, not
preference. "Subjective" criteria of interpersonal comparison evaluate
"the level of well-being enjoyed by a person in given material
62. There may be cases in which potentially massive burdens to future generations justify
present ones in bearing some cost whose benefit will be reaped by others-perhaps present
sacrifices should be made now to avoid massive environmental harm later, for example. These
are special cases, and the criterion proposed here would have to be adapted to cope with them.
63. See infra Note that the same point could be made by saying that cost-benefit analysis
compares benefits that are not comparable, such as life saved and convenience.
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circumstances or the importance for that person of a given benefit or
sacrifice ... solely from the point of that person's tastes and
interests."64 "Objective" criteria appraise burdens and benefits in
terms that are "the best available standard of justification...
mutually acceptable to persons whose [aims, ends, and] preferences
diverge."65 In a world in which people's ends are diverse and
incommensurable, comparisons of well-being must be made on the
basis of criteria that are independent of any particular ends or
preferences and sensitive to the urgency of the claims at stake.
Freedom of action and security are "objective" criteria of
interpersonal comparison, albeit highly abstract ones. Their
importance does not depend on affirming any particular conception of
the good or on holding any particular set of final ends and aspirations.
Their importance depends on having ends and aspirations, and on
having a fundamental interest in being able to realize those ends and
aspirations over the course of a normal life span. Freedom and
security are essential conditions for the pursuit of most of the ends of
human beings, especially when we consider ends pursued over the
course of a lifetime.
In comparing burdens and benefits to freedom and security we
must ask how much the burdens and benefits disrupt or promote the
capacity of those affected to pursue their ends and aspirations over the
course of a normal life. Death and devastating injury are great
burdens, whereas the inconvenience of missing an evening of
"Baywatch" is not-no matter how subjectively intense someone's
desire to watch "Baywatch" may be-because death and devastating
injury interfere with our ability to realize our ends over the course of a
life far more gravely than missing an evening of one's favorite
television show.66 Considerations of urgency underlie our judgments of
comparability. In turn, these considerations rest tacitly on ideas about
the course of a normal life and the conditions which favor its pursuit,
on judgments about the relative importance of avoiding severe pain
64. Scanlon, supra note 30, at 656.
65. Id. at 668.
66. This is what Thomas Scanlon calls a "normalizing assumption." See Scanlon, The
Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, supra note 30, at 382-83.
[W]e take it as given for purposes of moral argument that it is very important that
what one wears and whom one lives with be dependent on one's choices and much less
important that one be able to choose what other people wear, what they eat, and how
they live. And we do this despite the fact that there may be some who would not agree
with this assignment of values.
Scanlon, supra note 53, at 183.
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and avoiding inconvenience, on ideas about the goods and conditions
which enable us to pursue our ends, and so on.
The abstractness of these ideas sets a challenge for objective
approaches to interpersonal comparison. That challenge is to
"construct a more concrete conception of welfare in terms of particular
goods and conditions that are recognized as important to a good life
even by people with divergent values."67 Negligence law constructs
more concrete conceptions by making "normalizing" assumptions-
assumptions that children do not need the freedom to engage in adult
activities but do need the freedom to engage in risky activities
appropriate to their age and development, assumptions that the need
of those with various disabilities to lead independent and self-
sufficient lives justify the imposition of some extra burdens on others
(e.g., the extra burden of coping with blind pedestrians assisted by
seeing eye dogs and canes) but not other burdens (e.g., the burden of
coping with blind automobile drivers). These judgments are socially
contingent and contestable. Our sense of what activities are "age
appropriate" varies from era to era, in accordance with shifts in our
ideas about the course of normal human development and the
ordinary capacities of children of various ages, changes in our ideas of
acceptable risk, and so on. Our conceptions of just how much the
"disabled" are capable of leading "normal" lives, and of just how much
the "normal" must accommodate the disabled and vice-versa, also shift
over time.
We may hope that shifts in our sense of "age appropriate"
activities, and our sense of how far we should go to accommodate
various disabilities, express progress. But whether or not they express
progress, shifts in our ideas about the needs and capacities of children
and the developmentally disabled affect our evaluations of the
burdens and benefits of various kinds of risk imposition. Safety- and
feasibility-based risk regulation likewise rest on tacit claims of
comparable value which are similar both in their social contingency
and in their contestability. Needs that are urgent in one period-the
need for enough food to prevent malnutrition, for instance-may not
be urgent in another. A fundamental task of this Article is to
reconstruct the "concrete conceptions of welfare," the "particular goods
and conditions" which underpin and justify these statutory
standards.68
With this sketch of the fairness framework in hand, we are in a
position to take up the details of safety- and feasibility-based risk




regulation. Those details are complex, but the basic normative
argument in support of these standards is not. Considerations of
fairness and comparable value justify reducing risks of devastating
injury to the point where they are insignificant-the demand of safety-
based regulation-when the benefits of significant risk, like
inconvenience, are trivial in comparison to the increase in death and
devastating injury that is their price. Reducing risks of devastating
injury as far as we feasibly can without crippling the beneficial
activity which generates the risks-the demand of feasibility
analysis-is justified when the long-run flourishing of the activity is a
good morally comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury.
The fairness rationale is the same in both cases: It is (presumptively)
unfair to devastate a few for the sake of gains which are not
comparable, morally speaking, to the hardship wreaked by death and
devastating injury, no matter how many others may reap those gains
and even if the total quantity of "benefit," as measured by cost-benefit
analysis, exceeds the total "cost" of the devastation that is its price.
Protecting the fundamental interests of each person trumps
maximizing aggregate well-being. Death and devastating injury may
only be inflicted to avoid comparable harms to, or to confer comparable
benefits on, others.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS: COST-JUSTIFIED, FEASIBLE, AND SAFE
PRECAUTION
In comparison with negligence law's notion of reasonable risk
imposition-a notion which is enormously rich, but also susceptible to
a variety of plausible interpretations-the cost-justified, feasible, and
safe standards of acceptable risk imposition are well defined. 69 They
identify distinct levels of permissible risk imposition, and they stand
in linear, vertical relation to one another: 70
Cost-justified risk reduction. Among these three standards, the
cost-justification standard tolerates the most risk. Costs and benefits
are aggregated, with the aim of minimizing the costs of paying for and
preventing accidents, thereby maximizing the benefits extracted from
the risky activity at issue. "Cost-benefit" analysis requires risks to be
reduced to the point where the costs of further precautions exceed
69. My discussion here follows the presentation of these standards in Cost-Assessment, in
KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 952-56, and his commentary on that
note in KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-5 to 20-6.
70. See Sargentich's comments in KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-
684 [Vol. 56:653
PRESSING PRECAUTION
their benefits. If the marginal costs of eliminating significant risks
exceed the marginal benefits, significant risks will continue to exist.
Feasible risk reduction. The feasibility standard tolerates less
risk. Feasibility analysis looks to achieve the lowest level of risk
practically attainable, not the level of risk that minimizes the
combined costs of injuries and their prevention, thereby maximizing
the benefits of the risky activity at issue. Feasibility analysis requires
the elimination of significant risks, when they can be eliminated
without threatening the long-run health of the activity to which the
risks belong. The costs of risk reduction matter, but only to the extent
that those costs are sufficient to impair the long-run survival of the
risky enterprise. Cost-justified risks are eliminated, so long as their
elimination is compatible with the long-term flourishing of the activity
at issue, and significant risks remain only if their elimination would
threaten the survival of the activity.
Safe level of risk imposition. The safe-level standard tolerates
the least risk. Safety-based regulations require risk to be reduced to a
point where no "significant risk" of devastating injury remains.
Applying the safe level standard therefore does not require any
inquiry into the costs of risk reduction. All that it requires is a
determination of the level at which the risk created by exposure to the
regulated substance ceases to be "significant."
The two standards which most interest us-the safety and
feasibility standards-also have their characteristic domains of
application.
A. The "Safe" Level of Risk Imposition
The safe-level approach is taken in some aspects of clean air,
clean water, and pure food legislation, particularly regulation of toxic
substances that may endanger public health. The Food Quality
Protection Act of 199671 is a case in point. The Act regulates the
amount of pesticide that may be present on foods, both fresh and
processed. It requires that tolerances for pesticide be set at a level
that is safe, where "safe" means that "there is reasonable certainty
that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue, including all dietary exposures and all other
exposures."7 2 Regulators are instructed to set limits that provide "an
additional margin of safety" in light of the special susceptibility of
71. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 346(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
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infants and children to harm from toxic substances.73 Pesticide
chemical residue on food is therefore permissible only to the extent
that it is reasonably certain to harm no one, not even those unusually
susceptible to harm.
Clean air regulation also incorporates safety-based
regulation. 74 A provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, for
example, focuses on carcinogenic risks remaining after technology-
based regulations for hazardous pollutants have been in effect for
eight years. 75 If a numerically defined level of cancer risk has not been
achieved by that point, the EPA is directed to issue additional
regulations which will "provide an ample margin of safety to protect
public health."76 The regulatory aim behind these provisions is "to
reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
emissions.., to less than one in one million."77 Some residual risk
thus survives safe-level regulation. Requiring that "lifetime excess
cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions" be reduced
"to less than one in one million" expresses a judgment of significance.7 8
A lifetime risk of cancer (from a regulated emission) that crosses the
"one in a million" threshold crosses from the domain of insignificant
risk into the domain of significant risk.
The emphasis on those most exposed to risk or those most
susceptible to it-those most disadvantaged by the risks being
regulated-is a recurring theme in safety-based regulation. Clean
water regulation supplies a closely related example: the court in
Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency insists on especially
stringent precaution against grave harm, even though the chances of
that harm materializing cannot be estimated.7 9 The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the court held, authorized
health-based regulation of toxic effluents without consideration of
"feasibility, achievability, practicability, economic impact, or cost," and
addressed standards for determining permissible discharge levels for
such toxins. EPA discharge standards, the court ruled, must provide
an "ample margin of safety" and "protect against incompletely
73. § 346(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
74. For a clear statement that there are aspects of the Clean Air acts which leave no room
for either feasibility- or cost-based objections to compliance, see Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).




79. 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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understood dangers to public health and the environment, in addition
to well-known risks."80 The importance of safeguarding health trumps
the goods with which it competes, and the well-being of those most
imperiled comes to the fore. This is only natural: those most imperiled
bear the greatest burden.
B. Feasible Risk Reduction
The feasibility approach also governs aspects of clean air and
water regulation. The Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, for example,
provides that regulatory standards for hazardous air pollutants "shall
require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions" that the EPA,
"taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission
reduction," determines to be "achievable."81 Feasibility is also the
touchstone of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,82 and it
is in this context that it has received its most extensive application
and judicial interpretation.
Feasibility-based regulation has a more complex structure than
safety-based regulation. Feasibility analysis requires, first, the
identification of "a significant [workplace] health risk"8 3 and, second,
an analysis of the feasibility of reducing that risk without crippling
the activity that imposes the risk. Feasibility, in turn, has two
aspects-a "technological" one and an "economic" one. Technological
feasibility analysis asks: "What is the lowest level of risk technically
attainable?" "How much could we reduce this risk if we single-
mindedly set out to reduce it as much as possible?"8 4 Economic
feasibility analysis asks "What is the lowest level of risk whose costs
can be borne by the activity that imposes the risk at issue?"85 The aim
80. Id. at 104, 111.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2) (2000).
82. 29 U.S.C.A. §651(b) (2000).
83. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614 (1980) ("The Benzene
Case"):
We agree with the Fifth Circuit's holding that § 3(8) requires the Secretary to find, as
a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health risk
in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."
Unless and until such a finding is made, it is not necessary to address the further
question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that there must be a reasonable
correlation between costs and benefits, or whether, as the federal parties argue, the
Secretary is then required by § 6(b)(5) to promulgate a standard that goes as far as
technologically and economically possible to eliminate the risk.
84. See Feasibility Analysis, in KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at
965, 965-66 (discussing technological feasibility prong of feasibility analysis).
85. See KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 953-54, 966-67
(discussing economic feasibility prong of feasibility analysis).
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of feasibility analysis is to protect "worker health and safety within
the limits of economic possibility."86 "Congress itself defined the basic
relationship between costs and benefits [when it enacted the
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 with its feasibility
standard], by placing the 'benefit' of worker health above all other
considerations save those making the attainment of this 'benefit'
unachievable."87 Feasibility analysis looks to achieve the lowest level
of risk practically attainable.
Feasibility analysis shares with safety analysis the idea that a
risk must be significant before it is subject to regulation. "Feasibility"
is, however, a new idea. Let us, then, postpone detailed exploration of
significance until we have fleshed out the two dimensions of
feasibility-the technological and the economic.
1. Technological Feasibility
The technological side of feasibility analysis asks, as a matter
of engineering technique, what is the lowest level of risk achievable by
an ongoing activity. Any limit set on risk-a "permissible exposure
level" ("PEL") for a toxic substance, for example-must be
technologically attainable. Technological achievability, however, is not
fixed by the outer limit of technological possibility at a given moment
in time, because the most advanced techniques of risk control in place
at a given moment in time may fall well short of the frontier of
technological feasibility. The frontier of technological feasibility is
fixed not by the best present practice, but by the engineering practice
that might be achieved through a dogged commitment to feasible risk
reduction. A regulatory agency promulgating a feasibility-based risk
regulation may therefore specify an acceptable level of risk lower than
that attainable through the application of existing techniques, if the
agency can reasonably predict that technical capability will advance
sufficiently to make that level of risk reduction attainable within the
time frame of the regulation.
In American Iron & Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, for example, OSHA's standard for coke oven
emissions was upheld as technologically feasible even though "the
most modern and clean coke oven battery operating" met the standard
86. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (Wright, J.).
87. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1982) ("The Cotton Dust
Case").
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only one-third of the time.88 Evidence of one-third compliance using
less than all suitable technology-plus dramatic progress toward
compliance at another plant after new engineering controls were
implemented-showed sufficiently that the standard was not
"impossible of attainment."8 9 The question was not what could be done
at the moment, but "what the industry could achieve in an effort to
best protect its ... employees," given a determination to exploit
"technological potentialities." 90 The court therefore approved OSHA's
reliance on "innovative technology currently in the experimental
stage," and its faith in new techniques "'looming over the horizon.' "91
In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, Judge J. Skelly Wright
gave the following summary of the concept of "technological
feasibility":
The oft-stated view of technological feasibility under the OSH Act is that Congress
meant the statute to be "technology-forcing." This view means, at the very least, that
OSHA can impose a standard which only the most technologically advanced plants in an
industry have been able to achieve-even if only in some of their operations some of the
time. But under this view OSHA can also force industry to develop and diffuse new
technology. At least where the agency gives industry a reasonable time to develop new
technology, OSHA is not bound to the technological status quo. So long as it presents
substantial evidence that companies acting vigorously and in good faith can develop the
technology, OSHA can require industry to meet PEL's never attained anywhere ....
As for [proof of] technological feasibility, we know that we cannot require of OSHA
anything like certainty. Since "technology-forcing" assumes the agency will make highly
speculative projections about future technology, a standard is obviously not infeasible
solely because OSHA has no hard evidence to show that the standard has been met.
More to the point here, we cannot require OSHA to prove with any certainty that
industry will be able to develop the necessary technology, or even to identify the single
technological means by which it expects industry to meet the PEL. OSHA can force
employers to invest all reasonable faith in their own capacity for technological
innovation, and can thereby shift to industry some of the burden of choosing the best
strategy for compliance. OSHA's duty is to show that modern technology has at least
conceived some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to be capable of meeting
the PEL and which the industries are generally capable of adopting.
Our view finds support in the statutory requirement that OSHA act according to the
"best available evidence." OSHA cannot let workers suffer while it awaits the Godot of
scientific certainty.92
The requirement of technological feasibility thus imposes
stringent risk-reducing demands. It fixes the presumptively
appropriate level of precaution not by reference to what is customarily
88. 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 834.
90. Id. at 833-34.
91. Id. at 833, 835.
92. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).
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done, nor even by reference to the best that is now done, but by
reference to the best that might be done, given an unstinting
commitment to the goal of feasible risk reduction.
2. Economic Feasibility
In Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, the court
provided an explanation of the economic side of feasibility analysis. 93
The court interpreted language in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970
requiring "the degree of emission limitation achievable ... taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction."94 It held that this
language did not require the EPA to undertake "a quantified cost-
benefit analysis" in order to justify its air pollution standard for new
or modified cement plants. 95 The EPA's conclusion that the cement
industry could absorb the cost of control devices without detriment to
competition between cement and substitute products, even though
some plants might have to close, sufficed to answer the "essential
question" under the Act: "whether the mandated standards can be met
by a particular industry for which they are set."96 Judgments of
economic feasibility require "cost-assessment," but they do not require
"cost-benefit analysis."97 Indeed, insofar as the criterion of cost-
justified precaution requires less precaution than the criterion of
economic feasibility does, the criterion of economic feasibility rejects
the criterion of cost-justification outright.
Provisions of the Clean Water Act, which mandate pollution
control to the extent "technologically and economically achievable,"98
also illustrate the economic side of feasibility-based regulation. The
Clean Water Act subjects water pollution sources to two different sorts
of effluent limitations: those based on "the best practicable control
technology currently available" ("BPT"'), and those based on "the best
available technology economically achievable" ("BAT').99 The BPT
standard generalizes "the best existing performance" in an industry-
"control practices in exemplary plants"-despite an expectation of
"economic hardship, including the closing of some plants."100 The BAT
93. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 387.
96. Id. at 389.
97. Id. at 387.
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(B), 1317(a)(2) (2000).
99. § 1311(b)(2)(B).
100. EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 76 n.15, 79 (1980).
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standards are more stringent. They require "a commitment of the
maximum resources economically possible to the ultimate goal of
eliminating all polluting discharges."101 The setting of BPT standards
involves "cost-benefit analysis," but cost-benefit analysis is not part of
BAT determinations. In determining the economic achievability of a
technology, the EPA must consider "the 'cost' of meeting BAT
limitations, but need not compare such cost with the benefits of
effluent reduction."10 2
For "economic feasibility" analyses, then, the ultimate question
is not whether costs are outweighed by benefits, but whether the
industry is able to bear the cost. Economic feasibility regulation by
OSHA means "protecting worker health and safety within the limits of
economic possibility."'1 3 Judge Skelly Wright again explains:
The most useful general judicial criteria for economic feasibility come from Judge
McGowan's opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson.10 4 A
standard is not infeasible simply because it is financially burdensome, or even because it
threatens the survival of some companies within an industry:
Nor does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued
existence of individual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the
purposes of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an employer who has lagged
behind the rest of the industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and
is consequently financially unable to comply with new standards as quickly as other
employers....
A standard is feasible if it does not threaten "massive dislocation" to, or imperil the
existence of, the industry. No matter how initially frightening the projected total or
annual costs of compliance appear, a court must examine those costs in relation to the
financial health and profitability of the industry and the likely effect of such costs on
unit consumer prices .... [Ihe practical question is whether the standard threatens the
competitive stability of an industry, or whether any intra-industry or inter-industry
discrimination in the standard might wreck such stability or lead to undue
concentration.
[A]s for [proof of] economic feasibility, OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate
of compliance costs and demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that these costs will not
threaten the existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does portend
disaster for some marginal firms. 10 5
In the Cotton Dust Case, both the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court upheld OSHA's assessment of economic feasibility. 106
101. Id. at 74.
102. Rybacheck v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990).
103. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wright,
J.).
104. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (addressing the OSHA asbestos standard).
105. Id. (internal citations omitted).
106. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 659-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd in part and vacated in
part, Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522-36 (1981).
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OSHA had concluded that " 'compliance with the standard is well
within the financial capability' " of the cotton industry.107 The agency
noted that "although some marginal employers may shut down rather
than comply, the industry as a whole will not be threatened."'10 8 Both
courts agreed that OSHA had shown that the industry would be able
to absorb the projected costs. Regulatory requirements remain
economically feasible, the court of appeals wrote, even though they
"impose substantial costs on an industry ... or even [though they]
force some employers out of business," as long as they are not
"prohibitively expensive" and do not make " 'financial viability
generally impossible.' "09 The cotton dust controls fit "the plain
meaning of the word 'feasible,' " the Supreme Court wrote, given
OSHA's conclusion " 'that the industry will maintain long-term
profitability and competitiveness.' "110
3. Significance
Feasibility analysis, like safety analysis, requires the
identification of "significant risks" of "health injury."'11 What makes a
risk "significant" and why should significant risks be singled out for
special treatment? The significance requirement receives its canonical
exposition in the Benzene Case.112 Writing for the court, Justice
Stevens agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding that
§ 3(8) [of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970] requires the Secretary to find,
as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health
risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore "reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment. 11 3
Unless and until such a finding is made," the requirement that the
risk be reduced as far as technologically and economically feasible is
107. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 531 (citation omitted).
108. Id.
109. Marshall, 617 F.2d at 655, 661 (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
110. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 530 n.55, 531 (citations omitted).
111. Safety-based risk regulation requires the elimination of significant risks, whereas
feasibility-based regulation only requires the elimination of such risks if feasible.
112. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-59 (1980).
113. Section 3(8) of the Act provides:
The term "occupational safety and health standard" means a standard which requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2000).
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not triggered.114 Justice Stevens rejected OSHA's contention that no
significance requirement was necessary:
If the purpose of the statute were to eliminate completely and with absolute certainty
any risk of serious harm, we would agree that [OSHA's approach] would be proper ....
But we think it is clear that the statute was not designed to require employers to
provide absolutely risk-free workplaces whenever it is technologically feasible to do so,
so long as the cost is not great enough to destroy an entire industry. Rather, both the
language and structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it was
intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm.
By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are "reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment," the Act implies that, before promulgating any standard, the Secretary
must make a finding that the workplaces in question are not safe. But "safe" is not the
equivalent of "risk-free." There are many activities that we engage in every day-such
as driving a car or even breathing city air-that entail some risk of accident or material
health impairment; nevertheless, few people would consider these activities "unsafe."
Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered "unsafe" unless it threatens the
workers with a significant risk of harm.
Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the
Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is
unsafe-in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened
by a change in practices.
1 1 5
"Significance" appears to have two principal aspects. 116 First,
the risk must be salient-it must be distinguishable from other risks
associated either with the activity in question or with social life in
general. 117 It must stand out among its fellow risks. Second, to be
significant, when a risk ripens into harm it must inflict a severe
injury, a devastating injury, the kind of injury that seriously impairs
ordinary life.118 It seems natural to suppose that the same basic ideas
underlie the concept of significance as it is used in safety-based risk
regulation. Beyond these two points, however, just how to interpret
"significance" is a difficult question. Is significance a purely
quantitative notion? Some numerical threshold combining magnitude
and probability? Or is it a more qualitative and contextual judgment,
one which depends on the distinctive features of the context in which
it arises? May the numerically same risk of death be significant in the
workplace, but trivial in an extreme sport? May risks of equivalent
probability and magnitude in one sense-equal risks of death, for
example-vary in significance if one way of dying is more widely
feared than another?
114. 448 U.S. at 614.
115. 448 U.S. at 671-72 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
116. See KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-7.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 20-8.
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Significance is measured by a purely quantitative criterion at
least some of the time. The amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1990,
for example, aim "to reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the
individual most exposed to emissions ... to less than one in one
million."119 But the concept of significance cannot be exhausted by any
purely quantitative criterion. For one thing, the relation of
significance to serious injury-to devastating injury-builds
qualitative evaluation into the concept of significance. Devastating
injuries are ones which impair normal functioning-normal life-in
ways which cannot be repaired, and "normal life" is an evaluative
idea. Even the purely quantitative criterion of significance employed
by the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act operates against a
background in which the gravity of the harm being considered has
already been fixed qualitatively in this way. Cancer is generally a
serious disease-a disease quite capable of inflicting death and
devastating injury-and that is enough to establish that we have
especially urgent reason to reduce the incidence of such harm.
Significance eludes purely quantitative measure for another
reason as well: Significant risks are salient ones, and salience is a
matter of standing out. Salient phenomena stand out in a context,
against some background. 120 Salient risks are prominent ones, risks
which jut out in the context of the activity subject to regulatory
scrutiny. Probability of harm can be expressed by a purely
quantitative measure-by a number-but the significance of a
particular probability of harm depends in part on the background
against which (or the context within which) that probability is framed.
That background or context can be general or particular, or general in
some ways and particular in others. Particular risks of cancer, for
example, can involve the general risk of contracting the disease, the
general risk of contracting that particular cancer, or the other risks of
some occupation, and so on.
Consider the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The
significance of the risk of cancer addressed by those amendments is
dependent in this way on some background. Discussion of "excess
cancer risks" presumes a preexisting risk of cancer, a risk independent
of exposure to the particular emission being appraised. The idea of
"excess risk" implies the idea of "background risk," of cancer risk
independent of exposure to any particular carcinogen (though not
119. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
120. As Lewis Sargentich puts it: "The risk to be averted must be ... noteworthy in
comparison with other risks of the same activity that might also be reduced further by costly
measures." KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-7.
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necessarily independent of exposure to all of them). The Clean Air
Act's one-in-a-million threshold for "excess risk" thus defines an
acceptable level of increased risk for a harm whose gravity we have
already largely agreed upon, and of which there is a preexisting
incidence. Why fix on "one in a million" as the threshold separating
acceptable increases in excess risk from unacceptable ones? Three
reasons readily come to mind. First, we already face greater threats in
our daily lives-the annual risk of death by automobile accident, for
example is one in six thousand, and the annual risk of death from
cancer is a little less than one in two hundred. 121 Given these other
threats, we feel justifiably comfortable entirely disregarding excess
risks of cancer less than one in a million-in treating them as
functionally equivalent to no risk at all.122 Second, because the
background risk of cancer is alarming, and we are eager not to see it
increase. Third, "one in a million" has a natural prominence-a
salience-as a measure of significance arbitrary in its exactitude but
reasonable in its general order of magnitude. Who would fix on one in
997,832?23
To see more clearly just how and why the concept of
significance cannot be exhausted by purely quantitative criteria,
consider the risk of gas tank explosions in automobile accidents-the
subject of the famous Ford Pinto case. 124 Risks of gas tank explosions
strike us, intuitively, as prominent risks of driving. Among the myriad
risks of automobile accidents, the dangers of fire and explosion stand
out. The explosive potential of gasoline makes it especially dangerous.
Most of us imagine that it is particularly horrible to be burned to
death, and many of us may think it worse still to survive a terrible fire
horribly disfigured. These judgments involve assessments of
121. NAT'L CANCER INST., 2001 CANCER PROGRESS REPORT 53 (2001) (noting that the annual
risk of dying of cancer, as of 1998, was 471 in 100,000), available at
http://progressreport.cancer.gov/additionalMaterials/sectionPDFs/NCI-CPR2001.PDF. There are
15.23 automobile accident fatalities for every 100,000 people. NAT'L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000, at 2 (2001), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/TSF2000/2000ovrfacts.pdf.
122. 'The term 'reasonable certainty of no harm' means an increased risk of cancer to an
individual exposed over a lifetime of no more than one in a million." S. REP. No. 103-349 § 501
(1994).
123. Kathryn A. Kelly and Nannette C. Gordon's critical account of the origins of the one-in-
a-million standard lends some support to this hypothesis. They trace the standard to a one in
100 million number two scientists "pulled... out of a hat" in a 1961 article attempting to define
when exposure to a substance could be considered "safe." The FDA adopted that number in a
1973 notice in the Federal Register, and changed it to one in 1 million by the time that the final
rule was issued in 1977. Kathryn A. Kelly and Nanette C. Gordon, The Myth of 10-6 as a
Definition of Acceptable Risk, EPA WATCH, Sept. 15, 1994.
124. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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magnitude which might be expressed quantitatively: people might be
able to rank injury by gasoline explosion on a scale with other possible
injuries from automobile accidents, and we might be able to assign a
number to the relative disvalue that they place on such injuries. But a
judgment that the risks of gasoline tank failure are a significant risk
of driving is a comparative one, in part, and this comparison cannot be
made without attending to context. The difference in significance of
risks of gas tank explosions in motorcycles and cars, respectively,
illustrates this point.
The numerical risk of gasoline tank explosions is equal in
motorcycles and in passenger cars, and the risks of gas tank
explosions may well be more dangerous in motorcycles, 125 since riders
are both closer to and less protected from their gas tanks. 126 Does it
follow that the risk of gas tank explosions is as significant for
motorcycles as it is for passenger cars? It seems unlikely to me that it
does. Even if gas tank explosions are equally frequent and more
dangerous in motorcycles than in passenger cars, the risk of gas tank
explosion is qualitatively more significant in passenger cars. The risks
associated with motorcycle gas tanks are framed by the heightened
risks characteristic of motorcycles. The exposed character of
motorcycle riding, and the relatively small size of motorcycles in
comparison with cars and trucks, expose motorcyclists to a host of
other substantial risks-to greater-than-normal risks of being crushed
by collisions with other vehicles, greater-than-normal risks of being
thrown from their cycles, and greater-than-normal risks of severe
head trauma, to name just three. Risks of gasoline tank explosion do
not stand out as comparably salient-comparably significant-in such
company.
The heightened risks of gas tank explosion in passenger cars-
Ford Pintos, for example-are, by contrast, salient, gratuitous, and
unexpected in just the way that the risks of gas tank explosion in
motorcycles are not. Ford Pintos were family cars: children rode in
their back seats. Pinto purchasers sought, implicitly, a higher level of
safety than motorcyclists. Implicit in the purchase of a subcompact
125. In both passenger cars and motorcycles there is a 0.1% chance of a fire occurring. NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000, at 66 (2001), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF200O.pdf.
126. "Per vehicle mile traveled in 1999, motorcyclists were about 18 times as likely as
passenger car occupants to die in a motor vehicle traffic crash and 3 times as likely to be
injured." NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000: MOTORCYCLES 2,
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdflnrd-30/NCSA/TSF2000/2000mcyfacts.pdf. In 1999,
there were 23.5 fatalities for every 100 million vehicle miles traveled by motorcycle, but only 1.3
fatalities for every 100 million vehicle miles traveled by passenger car. Id.
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family sedan is a desire to reduce the risks of private automotive
transportation, consistent with the constraints imposed by the fact
that the car being purchased is a comparatively inexpensive
subcompact. In this context, the risks of gas tank fires stand out, quite
independent of any hidden flaw in the car. For people who are trying
to keep their children safe, the risks of an automobile's gas tank are
especially salient. Gasoline explosions threaten horrible deaths,
horrible disfigurements, and terrible psychological trauma. 127 These
characteristics make the risks of gas tank explosion in subcompact
cars qualitatively significant in a way that risks from motorcycle gas
tanks are not, even if those risks are quantitatively much greater.
The significance of a risk, then, is not fundamentally a
quantitative matter, a matter of statistical probability, and magnitude
measured quantitatively. Significance depends on both gravity and
salience. Determining the gravity of a risk requires evaluative and
qualitative judgments-judgments about how much we should fear a
particular kind of harm or harms, how much a particular harm
impairs the pursuit of a normal life, how bad it would be to live with
that harm, and so on. Determining the salience of a risk requires not
just an appraisal of the risk's numerical probability, but also an
evaluation of how prominent the risk is in comparison to the other
risks of an activity, how expected it is, how gratuitous it is, and so
forth.
IV. JUSTIFICATION: THE MORAL BASIS OF SAFETY- AND FEASIBILITY-
BASED RISK REGULATION
Safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation raise three basic
questions. First, why should we push beyond the cost-justified level of
safety, beyond the point of maximum benefit, economically conceived?
Second, if we should push beyond the cost-justified level of safety, why
should we eliminate only significant risks of physical injury? Why not
eliminate all risks of physical injury? Third, why should we sometimes
require the elimination of all significant risks of injury and other
times require only the elimination of those significant risks whose
elimination is feasible? Why are we prepared to shut down some
activities that cannot be made safe, but not others?
127. The specific facts of the Pinto's design made the failure of its gas tank even more
salient. In comparison with other subcompact cars, the design of the Pinto's gas tank was
singularly inferior, no functional necessity justified its inferiority, and that inferiority came as a
shock and surprise to the owners and users of Pintos, who had no reason to think that they were
purchasing a substandard subcompact. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1031-32.
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A. Why Demand More-than-Cost-Justified Precaution?
Reasons of fairness, I have argued, justify pressing precaution
beyond the point of cost-justification. 128 It is unfair to inflict even one
death for the sake of trivial gains to others, no matter how numerous
those others may be, and it is equally unfair to devastate even one
person so that many people may reap trivial benefits. Unrestricted
cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with these convictions.
Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis assumes that all burdens and
benefits are fungible at some ratio of exchange, so that a sufficient
quantity of any benefit will suffice to justify the infliction of
devastating injury, no matter how trivial that benefit may be
qualitatively speaking. If enough people stand to be disappointed by
the termination of a television show, terminating the life of a
television technician may be preferable to terminating the broadcast
of the show. Terminating the life of a television technician may
maximize both wealth and utility.
This assumption of universal comparability is mistaken. Not
everything is morally comparable to death and devastating injury. No
amount of inconvenience, for example, can justify inflicting a
devastating injury on someone. The existence of discontinuities of
value-the fact that not everything is comparable in value to
undevastated human life-gives us reason to reject unrestricted cost-
benefit analysis and to refuse to fix the appropriate level of precaution
against risks of devastating injury by applying the standard of cost-
justification. Inflicting death and devastating injury on some person or
class of persons is only justified if doing so realizes some comparable
value, some equally urgent benefit to some other persons or class of
persons. We therefore have good reason to press precaution beyond
the point of maximal benefit, economically conceived, when the gains
to be won are not morally comparable to the death or devastation that
is their price.
Concern with the actual distribution of burdens and benefits
among affected persons buttresses the case for moving beyond the
point of cost-justified precaution. When significant risks of physical
injury ripen into death and incurable disease, the benefits of going
beyond the cost-justified level of precaution (and the burdens of failing
to do so) are measured in terms of lives saved and incurable diseases
avoided. To those who reap them, these are invaluable benefits. The
distributed costs of going beyond the cost-justified point of precaution,
128. See supra Part H.A.
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by contrast, may well be small-perhaps very small-losses to large
numbers of people. The fact, then, that a particular level of pesticide
residue on produce, or a particular level of benzene or cotton dust in a
workplace, maximizes the wealth that society extracts from the
activity at issue does not supply those who stand to lose their health
or their lives with good reason to accept the level of risk that efficiency
licenses. Society is extracting maximum advantage from the activity
by putting them in peril of great and readily avoidable harm. If the
sacrifice demanded of them could be avoided without imposing a
comparable sacrifice on others, then the risk should be reduced. When
avoiding great sacrifice on the part of a few requires only that many
shoulder modest burdens, many should shoulder modest burdens.
Devastating injuries are worth tolerating only if we must give up
something of comparable value to eliminate them.
B. Justifying the "Significance" Requirement
Considerations of fairness and comparable value justify moving
beyond the cost-justified level of precaution when risks of devastating
injury are at issue and justify both safety- and feasibility-based
regulation in broad outline. But by themselves they do not justify the
two central and striking characteristics of safety-based regulation.
First, that standard requires safety but not absolute safety. Both the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act 129 and the Supreme Court's
opinion in the Benzene Case130 make clear that the elimination of
significant risk is not the same as the elimination of all risk. So the
safe level of risk is not the same as "no risk." Second, safety-based
regulation is all risk evaluation and no cost assessment. Significant
risks must be reduced until they are insignificant, without regard to
cost, but insignificant risks are tolerated, again without inquiring into
the cost of eliminating them. These features of the statutory standard
raise a number of questions: Why draw the line at significance? Why
not eliminate all risks of devastating injury? Why ignore all of the
costs of eliminating significant risks? If we are prepared to eliminate
"significant risks" without regard to cost, why should we refrain from
eliminating insignificant risks without so much as inquiring into the
costs of doing so?
129. See supra notes 74-78.
130. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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1. Why Does Safety-Based Risk Regulation Leave "Insignificant" Risks
of Devastating Injury Untouched?
Safety-based risk regulation is particularly stringent. As
familiar as we are with cost-benefit analysis, and its insistence on
balancing costs and benefits so as to extract the greatest possible
benefit from risky but valuable activities, we can hardly help but be
struck by the fact that categorical judgments of significance push risk-
reduction beyond the point of maximal benefit, economically
conceived. But the doctrine has a lax side as well-it leaves
insignificant risks entirely untouched-and this lenient side is equally
noteworthy. Why should a standard which forbids trading safety
against costs above some threshold level of risk have a threshold to
begin with? Even insignificant risks of devastating injury are risks of
devastating harm. A lifetime excess cancer risk of less than one in a
million is still a risk of a devastating disease, and devastating disease,
when it materializes, wreaks havoc in our lives. At worst, it ends life
prematurely and traumatically. At best, it impairs life severely,
foreclosing the pursuit of certain activities and ways of life, seriously
hampering the pursuit of others, and often leaving us with enduring,
agonizing pain and suffering. The fact that it impairs our lives so
seriously is, after all, what makes devastating harm devastating.
Why, then, should we tolerate any risk of such harm?
An answer to that question lies in the fundamentals of the
predicament we explored earlier.131 We each have various aims, ends,
and aspirations to pursue over the course of our lives. We may each
expect, with decent luck, to pursue our aims and aspirations over the
course of normal life spans. To effectively pursue our aims and
aspirations over the course of complete lives, however, we need both
freedom to act (liberty) and freedom from physical harm (security).
Liberty and security are preconditions of rational agency. Like Rawls's
primary goods, liberty and security are things that we each need if we
are to realize any aims or aspirations. "Liberty" is essential because
we cannot survive without acting, yet "security" is equally essential.
Physical injury can end our lives prematurely or leave us permanently
impaired in ways that prevent us from pursuing many valuable ends
and aspirations, and even injuries which do not kill or permanently
harm us may disrupt our lives in ways that utterly upend our life
plans.
131. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Our predicament is that liberty and security conflict. Risk of
physical harm-diminished security-is the by-product of action.
Diminished liberty is the price of increased security. We cannot farm
or build or drive or fly-or mill cotton and refine benzene-without
taking and imposing risks of devastating injury. Forgoing all activity
would itself be a short path to death, and even if death could somehow
be avoided, forgoing all activity would cripple the pursuit of our aims
and aspirations as surely and severely as devastating physical injury
does. A world in which no one moves is a world in which few, if any,
aims, ends, and aspirations can be realized, and few, if any, lives can
be led. Some risk of devastating injury is the price of activity. These
risks are the "background risks of social life." 132 The only way to
eliminate them is by bringing activity to a halt. Some "background"
risks are typical of social life in general; they are not the price of any
particular activity but of "activity" in general. Other background risks
are typical of particular activities; they are the price of engaging in
those activities. Background risks are acceptable-worth bearing-
because eliminating them works even more harm to our ability to lead
the lives we wish to lead than bearing them does, even though these
risks are sure to result in some devastating injuries.
The fact that a low level of risk of devastating injury-the
background level of risk-is an inescapable price of activity explains
why a significance requirement must be introduced, implicitly or
explicitly, to even the most stringent standards of risk regulation. The
background level of risk must be accepted even though that level
results in some devastating injuries, because some risk of devastating
injury is the price of activity and activity is worth having. Before we
attempt to reduce a risk we must, then, first conclude that it crosses
the threshold which separates eliminable risks from uneliminable
ones. We must decide if the risk in question crosses a threshold of
"significance."133 Without a significance requirement, safety-based risk
regulation would be self defeating. One essential condition for leading
a worthwhile life-liberty-would be destroyed in the name of
securing another essential condition-security.
132. See KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-8 ("Safety means that no
significant risk remains. But safety is not attainable, by assumption, unless valuable activity
ceases."); Keating, supra note 7, at 350-52 (discussing a "mutually imposed and mutually
beneficial level of background risk" consisting of "very, very low probability risks" that are
"simply the price of freedom to act").
133. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the nature and role of the significance requirement).
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2. Why May We Inflict "Insignificant" Risks of Devastating Injury for
Trivial Reasons?
The inevitability of background risks presents a problem for
our critique of cost-benefit analysis. I have faulted unrestricted cost-
benefit analysis because it licenses the infliction of devastating injury
on a few for the sake of trivial gains to many.13 4 I have argued that,
when trivial gains to a large number of persons stand on the credit
side of the balance sheet and devastating harms to a few stand on the
debit side, the imposition of the risks in question should be forbidden.
No number of trivial gains to some can ever compare to a single
devastating injury to another. The gains and the losses are simply not
comparable, morally speaking. Our willingness to tolerate background
risks of devastating injury, however, suggests that we sometimes do
inflict devastation on a few for the sake of trivial gains by many.
When we count certain risks of fire among the background risks of life,
we countenance some incidence of death and disfigurement, and some
of that death and disfigurement will be occasioned by trivial gains to
others. When we count a risk which inflicts devastation on a very few
a "background risk of life," are we not countenancing the infliction of
devastating injury for the sake of trivial gain-for the sake of
inconsequential profit? If so, must not either our critique of cost-
benefit analysis or our toleration of background risk be mistaken?
The argument seems even stronger if we reflect once more on
driving. Driving is the riskiest of our ordinary activities. A normal
American driver exposes herself to an annual risk of death of
approximately one in six thousand.135 This, surely, is a significant risk
of devastating injury. A driver subject to a one in six thousand annual
risk of death is subject, over the course of a normal lifespan, to a
lifetime risk of death by driving of one in seventy-five. If a lifetime
excess risk of cancer of one in one million is "significant," a lifetime
risk of death of one in seventy-five is much more than significant. Yet,
precisely because driving is so essential to normal American life, we
routinely take to the road in pursuit of trivial ends-to get to work, to
go to the market, to rent videos, to take our children to softball
practices, and so on. Yet each time we drive, we impose a risk of
devastating injury.13 6 How can this be justifiable? How can such
trivial ends justify the infliction of a substantial amount of
devastating injury?
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. NAT'L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1999 (2000).
136. There are 1.5 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. Id.
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The risks of devastating injury imposed by the activity of
driving today may well be unacceptably high. In all likelihood, we
should be taking various steps-including encouraging people to use
public transportation-to reduce these risks. But it is a mistake to
believe that those risks are unacceptably high because each instance of
driving imposes a risk of devastating injury for the sake of trivial gain.
What is at stake is not individual trips, but a practice-the loose
practice of private automobile use as it now exists in this country.
Within the practice as we now conduct it, each of the innumerable risk
impositions which put others at risk of devastating injury for trivial
gain are essentially indistinguishable from each other. No trip to the
grocery store, to the movies, or to the theater, is especially urgent.
(Contrast an ambulance taking a critically ill person to a hospital.) So
if we judge any one of them unacceptable because it wrongly risks
devastating injury for trivial gain, we should judge all of them
unacceptable. When we do this, we encounter a cost which is not
trivial. Collectively, these mundane trips are an important part of a
normal life in our society. Doing without a private automobile in
contemporary Los Angeles, for instance, is a hardship-the kind of
hardship that makes the lives of the working poor in Los Angeles so
onerous. 137
There is an important lesson here, and it is independent of the
acceptability of the practice of private automobile use as it now exists
in our society. Even an acceptable practice of transportation will
impose some risk of devastating injury for trivial gain. By car, by
train, by foot, or by bike, we will still transport ourselves to work, to
the market, and to the video store, and in doing so we will still risk
death and devastating injury. Some "background risk" of devastating
injury is the price of any practice of transportation. That risk can be
avoided only by ceasing the practice of transportation entirely-an
unacceptably high cost. Some risks of devastating injury are therefore
justifiably imposed even though each instance of their imposition
realizes only trivial benefit, because there is no plausible way of
distinguishing among the instances of risk imposition that we are
considering, and the burden of eliminating all instances of such risk
imposition is comparable to the significant risk of devastating injury
137. This Article is not the place for an extended discussion of how best to reduce the risks of
driving to an acceptable level, but it is worth pointing out that this is an instance of a "lottery
paradox." "Lottery paradoxes" are discussed in connection with the significance requirement in
the text accompanying note 139 infra. In the case of driving the relevant paradox is that none of
us have good reason to change our practices individually-the burden to our lives is too great-
but we all have reason to change the practice collectively-the level of risk that it imposes is
unacceptably high. Systemic change, not individual action, is required.
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that the practice creates. The other side of this coin is that we have
reason to engage in particular instances of risk imposition falling
within the practice at issue, even though those instances risk
devastating injury for trivial gain. If we have reason not to forgo
driving as an activity, then we have reason to take to the road for
trivial reasons, even though we impose significant risks of devastating
injury when we do so. We cannot tell which trip to the grocery store or
to the movies will end in devastating injury. We therefore have no
good reason to forgo any particular trip, and good reason not to forgo
all of them.
Once we think of ourselves as adopting a principle to cover a
class of cases-once we train our gaze on a practice of risk
imposition-the dissimilarity between the activity of driving and the
hypothetical involving the endangered television technician becomes
evident. Life-threatening injuries to television technicians are not so
common that a practice of rescuing endangered technicians at the
price of shutting down television transmission for the duration of the
rescue is likely to jeopardize the very practice of transmitting
television signals. The burden of rescue will not seriously disrupt a
normal life, even over the long run. Forbidding going to the grocery
store, to the movies, or to work whenever doing so risks devastating
injury would, by contrast, profoundly disrupt our lives. It would forbid
most of our going out and about in the world and would preclude
living a normal life.
3. Probabilities, Precautions, and Paradoxes
This argument will likely strike some people as flatly
illogical. 138 Why should it matter whether we can distinguish one risk
that might be eliminated by a precaution whose cost is forgoing a
trivial benefit from a host of similar risks? If the risks really are
indistinguishable, the cost of eliminating each risk will be comparably
small and the benefits comparably great. If the incremental benefits of
the precaution needed to eliminate one of these risks exceed that
precaution's costs, the incremental benefits of the precautions needed
to eliminate each of these risks will exceed the combined costs of those
precautions. If not, some of the risks that we have grouped together
must be distinguishable from the one that we are considering. So long
as each incremental benefit exceeds each incremental cost, why should
it matter if the risk at issue is indistinguishable from five, fifty, one
138. Louis Kaplow pressed this charge forcefully in an exchange of letters.
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hundred, or five hundred other risks? Mere addition proves that if one
risk is worth eliminating, then they are all worth eliminating. It thus
seems irrational-rudimentary arithmetic error-to assert that it
matters whether or not a risk of devastating injury which might be
eliminated by a small precaution cost is indistinguishable from a host
of other risks. Our judgment about the reasonable course of action
with respect to a class of indistinguishable precautions is directly
opposed to our judgments about the reasonable course of action with
respect to each of the constituent parts of that class. Our judgments
about the correct course of action with respect to a heap of
indistinguishable precautions appear to violate firmly fixed canons of
rationality.
We have stumbled across a "lottery paradox," a case in which
our judgments about the correct course of action for a "class" of cases
conflicts with our judgment about the correct course of action for any
individual case within the class.139 In a "lottery paradox" you have a
class of events (e.g., lottery ticket 1, lottery ticket 2 ... ; automobile
errand 1, automobile errand 2 ...) in which (1) the probability of any
one of the events in the class leading to some further occurrence (e.g.,
winning the lottery, a serious accident) is sufficiently low as to justify
acting as though the further occurrence will not occur, but (2) the
probability of one of the events in the class resulting in that further
occurrence is sufficiently high to forbid acting as though none of these
further occurrences will result. (In the case of both lottery tickets and
automobile errands, we can, in fact, be certain that the further
occurrence will occur. Some ticket will win the lottery, and some
errand will end in a serious accident.) In the case of the lottery, the
paradox is that we are both justified and unjustified in acting as if
none of the tickets will win. It is simultaneously irrational for us to
purchase any particular ticket-the expected benefit is less than the
cost-and irrational for us to act as if none of the tickets is worth
purchasing.
In the risk imposition cases that are our concern, we seem
justified in acting as if (1) no single risk imposition is justified, but not
justified in acting as if (2) all identical risk impositions are unjustified.
We appear, for example, to be justified in forgoing a trip to the video
store to rent a movie because the expected benefits of the rental are
insufficient to justify running the risk of being killed in an automobile
accident. But we do not appear to be justified in forgoing all trips to
139. I am grateful to Gideon Yaffe for persuading me that the paradox at work here is a
'lottery paradox" and not a "sorites paradox." On "lottery paradoxes," see generally Dana K.
Nelkin, The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge and Rationality, 109 PHIL. REV. 373 (2000).
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the video store to rent movies-along with all comparably trivial
errands-because the cost of forgoing such a large part of normal life
is unacceptably great.140 Deep logical and conceptual puzzles involving
the relation between probability and justification may lurk here, but
the fairness puzzle that is our principal preoccupation seems both
explicable and solvable. The fairness of insisting that some precaution
be taken depends not so much on the cost of taking that precaution in
the case at hand as it does on the cost of taking that precaution in the
class of cases to which it applies. Practices of risk imposition, not
individual instances of risk imposition, are the law's basic unit of
analysis. 141 The requirement that like cases be treated alike requires
this general focus.
Questions of reasonable risk imposition are therefore questions
about the conduct of practices and the design of institutions. They are
not questions about the rationality of isolated individual acts. If we
must eliminate a host of similar risks should we proceed to eliminate
one risk whose distributed cost is small, then the cost of the
precaution necessary to eliminate that risk is the cost of eliminating
140. The problem may also appear in exactly the reverse form-each individual risk
imposition may be justified, while a class of such risk impositions does not appear justified. The
risks of smoking any single cigarette, for example, may be so low that we are justified in smoking
it even though the risks of smoking cigarettes as a habit are so great that we are not justified in
doing so. Indeed, some people think that the example in the text should be stated in reverse.
They believe that the risks of being killed on any particular errand may be so low that we are
justified in disregarding them entirely in deciding whether or not to run any particular errand,
while the risks of being killed on some errand are great enough that we are not justified in
disregarding them. In the case of automobile errands I confess to finding myself unable to decide
which formulation of the paradox is more appropriate. The particular form of the paradox which
elucidates the significance requirement of feasibility analysis, however, is the form in which
there are risks which are indistinguishable from each other-each of which, viewed individually,
is worth eliminating but all of which are not worth eliminating.
141. Risk impositions take on the character of a practice when they are not, in Holmes's
famous phrase, "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs," but are instead "incidents" of ongoing
activities. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
183 (Peter Smith ed., 1952) (1920). In contrast to the "practices" of sports, games, trials, and
ceremonies, "practices" of risk imposition are not well defined. Games, sports, trials, and
ceremonies embody sharply defined practices because they are largely autonomous, well-marked
domains of social life. Practices of risk imposition, in contrast, are comparatively ill-defined,
because they are aspects of activities which are thoroughly entangled in the untidiness of daily
life. The identification of "practices of risk imposition" is, moreover, heavily shaped by the legal
framework within which risks are appraised. The breadth with which "practices of risk
imposition" can be conceived by common law courts, for example, is limited by the case-by-case
character of adjudication. OSHA is, by contrast, institutionally equipped to take a wider view of
practices of risk imposition. "Practices" of risk imposition are nonetheless of fundamental
importance to modern accident law. Our social world is, as Holmes recognized, a world of
activities, not acts. In a "world of activities," the most important risk impositions have the
character of a "practice."
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all similar risks. The latter cost may be unacceptably high even when
the former cost is trivial.
Upon reflection, there should be nothing surprising about this
discrepancy between the reasonable course of action with respect to a
single action and the reasonable course of action with respect to a
class of such actions. It is as familiar as it is paradoxical. Consider the
rationality of smoking cigarettes. 142 If you enjoy smoking cigarettes, it
is always rational to smoke any given cigarette. The odds that
smoking any one cigarette will kill you are trivial. The odds that
habitual smoking will kill you are, by contrast, quite high. If you think
the odds of death from habitual smoking are unacceptably high, it is
entirely reasonable to make a habit of never smoking any cigarettes
even if you enjoy smoking and even though the odds that any one
cigarette will kill you are acceptably low. It is rational to do so not just
because smoking is addictive, but also because it is impossible to
identify the single cigarette that will kill you. A reverse phenomenon
underpins the significance requirement. If it is impossible to
distinguish among a substantial number of very small risks of grave
harm, each of which might be eliminated by a precaution whose cost is
very small, and if the aggregate cost to each prospective injurer of
taking all these precautions is unacceptably high, then it is rational
not to take any of the precautions even though each of them, viewed
individually, appears justified.
The paradoxical fact that the reasonable course of action for a
class of risks may differ from the apparently reasonable course of
action for a single risk imposition within that class thus explains and
justifies the significance requirement. Significance separates those
risks whose elimination is desirable from those whose elimination is
not. If a particular risk really is significant, then that risk is different
from a number of other risks, and the distributed cost of eliminating
that risk is not the cost of eliminating a host of indistinguishable
risks. If the distributed cost of the precaution necessary to eliminate
the risk does not impose an equally grave burden on anyone else, the
risk should be eliminated.
Significance thus distinguishes the realm of irreducible, or
unavoidable, risk from the realm of avoidable risk. Without the
significance requirement, safety-based regulation would require the
elimination of every discernible risk of devastating injury. But the
elimination of all discernible risk requires the elimination of all
142. This example is taken from WARREN S. QUINN, The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, in
MORALITY AND ACTION 198, 199 (1993). Quinn points out that the same is true about bites of




discernible activity. And the elimination of all discernible activity is a
cure worse than the disease it treats.
C. Permissible and Impermissible Aggregation: Combining Costs
Within and Across Persons
The preceding argument in support of the significance
requirement seems, however, to escape one criticism only to run afoul
of another. The argument combines separate risk impositions, each of
which risks devastating injury for trivial gain, into classes of similar
risk impositions whose cumulative importance is qualitatively greater
than the quantitative total of the parts summed. This procedure and
this claim appear inconsistent with the argument that cost-benefit
analysis aggregates harms impermissibly. Unrestricted cost-benefit
analysis, I have argued, is unacceptable because it allows a large
number of trivial harms to justify inflicting devastating injury, even
though none of the harms aggregated is comparable to the injury
whose infliction they collectively license. Yet the argument that we
have just advanced takes the cumulative effect of a host of trivial
benefits as comparable to some risk of devastating injury. In the case
of driving, for instance, we took the cumulative effects of being unable
to go to the theater, to work, to restaurants, and so on to be a kind of
detriment morally comparable to some risk of devastating injury.
What, if anything, makes the aggregation on which this claim depends
permissible?
Unlike the aggregation practiced by cost-benefit analysis-
which aggregates qualitatively different costs and benefits across
different people-the aggregation upon which our argument depends
involves only the aggregation of costs within the same persons. It is
the cumulative cost to each prospective driver that can rise to
comparability with driving's risks of devastating injury. It is the
cumulative effect on each prospective driver's life that is comparable
to devastating injury. Aggregation across persons ignores the
distinction between persons and sacrifices some for the benefits of
trivial gains to others. Aggregation within persons does not suffer
from this fault. 143 Those who extract the cumulative benefits of
imposing many risks for individually trivial reasons are also those
who bear the concomitant risks of devastating injury. If they could not
extract the benefit without bearing the burden, and if the aggregate
benefit is comparable to and greater than the burden, their lives are
143. See SCANLON, supra note 29, at 229-41, 237.
708 [Vol. 56:653
PRESSING PRECAUTION
not sacrificed for trivial advantage to others even when they
themselves suffer death or devastating injury at the hands of the
activity.
D. Why Exclude Costs Entirely?
These arguments justify and explain the threshold of
significance, but what of the second distinctive feature of safe-level
analysis-its disregard of the costs of reducing risks to the point of
insignificance? Consider, for example, the determination in the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996144 that tolerances for pesticide must be
set at a level that is safe, where "safe" means that "there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable
information." 145 This determination expresses a legislative judgment
that the costs of reducing pesticide residues to safe levels not only may
be disregarded entirely, but must be disregarded entirely.
Structurally, then, safety-based regulation is radically different from
cost-benefit analysis. To determine an appropriate level of safety, cost-
benefit analysis insists on balancing all relevant considerations (as it
conceives them) in a comprehensive calculus. Safety-based regulation
insists on excluding an entire class of arguably relevant reasons-
namely, costs-from the exercise of fixing an acceptable level of
risk.146
Why-or in what contexts-should we disregard entirely the
costs of eliminating significant risks, pursuing risk reduction until we
have cut the risk to the point at which it is no longer significant? The
answer to this question is simple enough in principle. We should
eliminate significant risks of injury when the costs of doing so are not
comparable to the devastation that significant risks are sure to wreak.
This answer suggests a division of labor between safety- and
feasibility-based risk regulation. Safety-based risk regulation is
appropriate when the costs of reducing risks of devastating injury to
the point at which they are no longer significant are not comparable to
the costs of bearing those risks of devastating injury. Feasibility-based
risk reduction is appropriate where the costs of reducing risks of
devastating injury to the point at which they are no longer significant
144. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
146. The "exclusionary" character of safety-based risk regulation should not be considered an
oddity. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (Princeton Univ. Press, 1990) (1975). Raz
rightly emphasizes the fact that norms of practical reason are often exclusionary in character.
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are comparable to the cost of bearing those risks of devastating injury.
These claims, however, beg some important questions: When is a
"cost" comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury? What
makes a cost "comparable" to a significant risk of devastating injury?
1. Comparability: Risks and Rewards
Judgments of comparability are complex. They are qualitative,
evaluative, and contestable. Consider the claim that missing an
episode of one's favorite television show and dying are not comparable,
while dying and being permanently paralyzed are comparable. This
claim rests on the idea that severity of harm depends largely on the
extent to which something interferes with a person's capacity to
realize diverse values and ends and to engage in the activities
constitutive of a normal life. Harms are comparable when they disrupt
the lives of those they affect in similarly urgent (or insignificant)
ways-when they impair ordinary activities, important activities, or
the pursuit of rational life plans, in similar ways. Burdens and
benefits are comparable when they improve or impair lives in
similarly urgent or insignificant ways. And these remarks conceal a
latent complication. In a world in which people's values, ends, and
aspirations are diverse and incommensurable, our thinking about
well-being and impairment must draw on ideas that people with such
diverse values might find mutually acceptable. Abstracting from
particular values, ends, and life plans, we can say that harms are
comparable when they strike at the preconditions of rational agency in
similarly severe (or similarly mild) ways.
Focusing on the ways in which risks and precautions impact
our fundamental interests in liberty is helpful-up to a point. It
explains, for instance, why we should bear "background" risks rather
than eliminate them. Eliminating background risk works greater
harm to one of the essential conditions of rational agency-the liberty
to pursue our diverse aims and aspirations-than bearing background
risk works to another essential condition of rational agency-the
physical integrity of the person. The costs of eliminating background
risk are thus not only comparable to the burdens of living with such
risk, they are also plainly greater than the burdens of bearing that
risk. Matters are rarely so stark, however. Most of the activities which
do or might put us at significant risk of devastating injury-driving
automobiles, riding motorcycles, flying planes, using pesticide on
crops, refining petroleum, milling cotton-are not essential to either
our liberty or our security. It is simply (or not so simply) a socially and
[Vol. 56:653710
PRESSING PRECAUTION
historically contingent fact that we engage in such activities, and that
they are important to us, sometimes for instrumental reasons and
sometimes for intrinsic ones. How should we think about
comparability of value when the cost of reducing risk is not
threatening the very existence of activity, but threatening some
historically and socially contingent activity? How can comparability
exist when we are comparing an essential condition of rational
agency-the physical integrity of the person-to an activity whose
very existence is an accident of history and technology?
2. Easy Cases
It helps to begin with a clear, and therefore easy, example of
comparability and to work our way to murkier and more difficult
examples. The clearest kind of comparability exists when the values
involved are identical-when the very same devastating injury is on
both sides of the calculus of risk and benefit. Suppose, for example,
that a large population is at risk of contracting a disease-polio, for
instance-which leaves a high percentage of those infected by it dead
or crippled. Suppose, too, that a vaccine is developed for the disease.
The vaccine is highly effective, but imperfect. Vaccination will prevent
many people from contracting polio but it will also cause a
significant-though far smaller-number of people to contract polio.
Given the present state of medical knowledge, however, the only way
to eliminate this significant risk of contracting the disease from the
vaccine is by discontinuing the use of the vaccine. Attempting to
reduce this risk by withdrawing the vaccine would be self-defeating.
The cost of reducing the significant risk of devastating injury created
by vaccinating people is more-not less-devastating injury. The
benefits of the vaccine are comparable to and greater than the
significant risk of injury that is its burden.147
Comparability matters to fairness. Imposing risks of
devastating injury is plainly fair when the imposition of those risks is
to the advantage of those subject to them. Our vaccination example
involves a "community of risk," albeit in a slightly unusual form. Each
member of the community is subject to the same preexisting risk of
disease, and each member of the community runs the same risks and
147. Mark Geistfeld suggests that value should be maximized whenever risks of
"nomonetizable" injury are traded off against one another. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 122 n.26.
For reasons briefly outlined below, I believe that this claim needs to be qualified. See infra Part
V.A. But the vaccination example in the text is a case where maximizing the relevant value-life
saved or disease avoided-is the correct way to proceed. More complex versions of this problem
may arise whenever risks are on all sides of a problem, so that precautions against one risk
increase other risks. I shall not directly address these problems in this Article.
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stands an equal chance of reaping the same benefits by submitting to
vaccination. The practice of vaccination is fair because the
administration of our hypothetical vaccine decreases each potential
victim's chances of contracting the disease. Vaccination is therefore to
the ex ante advantage of a representative member of the community
at risk of disease.' 48 When the benefits of vaccination are, at least in
significant part, a public good whose realization depends on everyone's
doing their part by participating in the program of vaccination, it is
presumptively fair to insist on a program of universal vaccination. 149
Those who contract the disease they are seeking to avoid as a result of
the program are unlucky, but they are not the victims of injustice.
Consider next a case in which the harms involved are not
identical, but are clearly comparable, because they are of the same
kind. The Pasteur vaccine for rabies, a favorite example cited in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, illustrates this kind of case. 150 The
Pasteur vaccine "not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected."151 Because, however, "the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the
use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable
high degree of risk which they involve." 152 Because the harms are of
the same kind (they impair health) and because they are both
severe-one, untreated, leads "to a dreadful death," the other often
leads to severe side effects-we do not hesitate to compare them. And,
because the threat to health posed by the disease is both graver and
more likely than the threat posed by the vaccine, we "are fully
justified" in administering the vaccine despite its unavoidable and
significant risks. Once again, the benefits of the vaccine are
comparable to and greater than the significant risk of injury that is
their burden.
The question of fairness is more complex in this case, though.
Because rabies is not easily transmitted, people infected with the
disease are not a significant risk to others. So the decision to take the
Pasteur vaccine is essentially a self-regarding one. The fact that it is
to an infected person's advantage to take the vaccine, even given its
148. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
149. By "presumptively fair," I mean that there can be special circumstances, such as special
religious beliefs, which justify exempting some people from an otherwise compulsory program.
The fact that these people become "free clingers" on the coordinated sacrifices of others is not
sufficient reason to compel them to act against their consciences.





side effects, is thus a reason why they should do so. Someone who fails
to do so may be criticized as irrational-they are very likely harming
themselves, but they are not treating anyone else unfairly. Individual
consent is therefore usually required before the vaccine can be
administered, and when consent is withheld it cannot usually be
overridden. Considerations of fairness and justice control only when
individual consent is impossible to obtain. Because the administration
of the Pasteur vaccine is reasonably thought to be to the advantage of
those infected with rabies, imputing consent through the reasonable
person standard is fair1 53 unless we know of special reasons why the
patient at issue would refuse the vaccine. Someone who has the
vaccine administered when they are incapable of consent and who now
asserts that she would not have consented had she been capable
cannot claim unfair treatment unless she can show that those
administering the vaccine should have known that she-unlike the
reasonable person-would not have consented were she capable of
giving or withholding consent.
3. Hard Cases
Now, let us turn to more difficult cases of comparability. In
these cases, devastating injury-threat to life and limb-is on one side
of the calculus of risk and the value of some activity which does not
contribute to saving life or limb is on the other side. The activity itself
is historically particular and the good it realizes mundane in
comparison with saving life and limb. Here, judgments of
comparability depend both on appraising the good realized by the
activity in question and on the particular characteristics of the risks in
question. (In appraising the good in question, we must be sensitive to
the plurality and diversity of values. We must ask not how valuable
we find an activity, but whether some reasonable people might find it
valuable and, if so, why.) So let us consider and compare two sets of
plainly significant risks: the risks of riding motorcycles and the risks
of smoking. 54
153. Physicians "may take medically indicated steps that do not risk more harm than they
are likely to avoid, provided that the physician has no reason to think the plaintiff would refuse
consent." 1 DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 247 (2001).
154. Recall that the fatality rate for motorcyclists is 59.53 per every 100,000 registered.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 126. More than 400,000 Americans die from
smoking cigarettes every year. One in every five deaths in the United States is smoking related.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and
Years of Potential Life Lost-United States, 1990, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 645, 645,
Aug. 27, 1993, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwrfPDF/wk/mm4233.pdf.
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The heightened risks characteristic of motorcycling force us to
inquire into the good realized by the activity of riding motorcycles
because these risks cannot, in practice, be disentangled from the
aspects of the activity that make motorcycling something one might
like to do. Motorcycling is exceptionally dangerous because
motorcyclists travel at the speed of automobiles without the protection
of passenger compartments. The cost of reducing the risks of
motorcycling to a more modest level is the cost of adding passenger
compartments to motorcycles. Adding passenger compartments to
motorcycles, however, transforms the activity to the point of
destroying it. Motorcycles with passenger compartments are no longer
motorcycles. The inseparability of motorcycling's riskiness from the
constitutive characteristics of the activity makes the principal cost of
risk reduction the destruction of the activity. So we must ask: Is the
activity of motorcycling a valuable one, an activity which some
reasonable people might find enjoyable enough to be worth its very
substantial risks?
Thinking about the values realized by the activity of
motorcycling leads to thinking about the value of taking risks.
Riskiness itself-the opportunity to put one's physical safety at more
than normal peril-may well be one of the things that makes
motorcycling attractive. Even if it is not-even if most motorcyclists
are not risk-seekers in that sense; even if they only enjoy the sensual
thrill of experiencing high-speed travel-that particular sensual
experience can only be purchased at the price of dramatically
increased risk of serious physical injury. Taking this to be some rough
specification of the intrinsic goods of motorcycling, we must ask, then,
how valuable these goods are. Valuable enough to justify bearing the
substantial risks that are their price?
The answer to this question is powerfully affected by the fact
that the risks of the activity are borne largely by participants in it-
not by strangers to it-and by the fact that participation in the
activity is largely a matter of voluntary choice. The distribution of
some risk and the voluntariness with which it is or is not borne are
critical to the risk's acceptability. We would not allow people to drive
cars with unshielded, external gas tanks just for the thrill of it, for
example. The risk to the rest of us-who did not choose to purchase
such risky vehicles and who do not reap either their thrills or their
substantial cost savings-is unacceptably high. Interfering in other
people's freely chosen activities because we do not ourselves find the
goods they realize worth the risks they require is, by contrast,
unacceptably meddlesome-unjustifiably paternalistic. The
[Vol. 56:653
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heightened risks of motorcycling are acceptable in part because we
recognize that risk taking plays an important role in activities we
recognize as valuable for at least some reasonable people (think, for
example, of all extreme sports and many not-so-extreme ones). But
they are also acceptable because they fall largely on motorcyclists, and
because the choice to ride a motorcycle is largely an unburdened one.
Motorcycling is a mode of transportation, but, in its voluntariness, the
choice of motorcycling as a form of transportation is analogous to the
choice to engage in a risky recreational activity. Considerations of
fairness recede when risks are borne by those who impose them, and
when those who impose and bear them do so voluntarily.
The substantial risks of riding motorcycles are acceptable
because: (1) those risks are inseparable from the activity; (2) the
activity realizes values which we can imagine figuring in a plausible
and defensible human life; and (3) the special, substantial risks of
motorcycling are largely born by motorcyclists, and voluntarily so. To
put it differently, we may reasonably judge the costs of reducing
motorcycling's substantial risks to be comparable to the costs of
bearing those risks, because the value sacrificed in reducing the risk is
one that figures in a valuable way of life, and the costs of realizing
those values is voluntarily borne by those who find the values
especially important. Unless we believe it is actually irrational for
people to ride motorcycles, then we have no reason to insist on
reducing the very substantial risks of motorcycling when the price of
risk reduction is the destruction of the activity itself.
The activity of smoking contrasts nicely with motorcycling.
Here, too, the risks of the activity seem inseparable from its
enjoyment. Here, too, the decision to take up the activity falls on the
unforced end of the spectrum (though substantial ingenuity has been
and still is invested in seducing children and teenagers into taking up
a powerfully addictive pastime). Here, too, the most salient way to
reduce the risks of the activity to a level closer to the normal risks of
life is by curtailing the activity. 155 But smoking and motorcycling
differ in other ways, ways which affect our evaluations of the "cost" of
curtailing the activity of smoking. For one thing, smoking imposes
substantial risks on nonsmokers, at least when it is practiced
indoors.1 56 The risks of smoking are less self-regarding and more
155. The analogy is imperfect in this respect because the risks of smoking can be and have
been substantially reduced by installing filters on cigarettes.
156. Environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") causes three thousand lung cancer deaths
annually for nonsmokers. TOBACCO INFO. PREVENTION SOURCE (Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.), Oct. 16, 2002, Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and
Cotinine Levels-Fact Sheet, at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/researchdata/environ-
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other-regarding than the risks of motorcycles. For another thing,
smoking is addictive. Partly for that reason, it is harder to explain just
how it is that smoking figures in a comprehensible and defensible
form of human flourishing. We understand how risk-taking might
figure in a valuable way of life more easily than we understand how
the self-destructive pursuit of pleasure might figure in a valuable way
of life. We suspect smokers of irrationality. We may therefore believe
that the costs of curtailing the activity are less weighty than the costs
of curtailing motorcycle riding. Even those who ostensibly suffer may
be the beneficiaries of a justified paternalism. Extensive efforts to
discourage smoking-especially taking up smoking-and extensive
efforts to stigmatize smoking as an activity, therefore seem justified.
The fact that we have difficulty recognizing how the "game" of
smoking might be "worth its candle" makes us unusually willing to
interfere with the self-regarding risks of smoking, even though we
could still consider it unjustified paternalism to ban smoking outright.
The perceived absence of comparable value is thus essential to our
current practices of regulation.
Important general lessons about comparability lurk in these
examples. The most abstract (and apparently fundamental) criterion
of comparability holds that comparability exists when the burden of
reducing some risk threatens freedom of action as gravely as the risk
itself threatens the physical integrity of the person. The kind of threat
this criterion contemplates is starkly visible in the case of background
risk. Eliminating background risk requires eliminating activity, and
the threat that this poses to freedom of action is even more grave than
the threat that background risk of devastating injury poses to the
physical integrity of the person. But this general account will only
take us so far. In some cases-our vaccine and treatment for rabies
examples-both risk and risk reduction register their cost in harm to
the physical integrity of the person. So long as the harm threatened is
equally grave, comparability does not present any particular problem.
Other things being equal, 157 the correct course of action is the one
which minimizes the total life lost or disease suffered (thereby
mentallfactsheet ets.htm. Yet another study found second-hand smoke to be a cause of lung and
other cancers, respiratory problems, and cardiovascular disease. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 6 (1986).
157. Other things are often not equal, as our examples show. It matters whether risks are
borne by those who impose them, whether the decision to engage in a risky activity is an
unburdened one, and whether rights are in play (as they are with the Pasteur vaccine). And this
is hardly a complete list. Judith Thomson's famous transplant example is another case in which
minimizing the life lost requires violating someone's rights. In that case, minimizing life lost is
clearly impermissible. See JUDITH JARvIs THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 134-38 (1990).
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maximizing the lives saved or disease avoided). Comparability is, in
fact, at its least problematic when the harm threatened by risk
reduction is identical to the harm threatened by the risk at hand, as it
is in our vaccine example. Questions of comparability are only slightly
more difficult when the harm threatened by the risk at issue and by
its reduction are of the same kind-health injury, in our rabies
treatment example-but where the health injury threatened by the
precaution is both less likely and less grave than the injury
threatened by the preexisting risk. Administering the Pasteur vaccine
for rabies is an easy call for both patient and doctor, even though
doing so creates a substantial probability of severe physical injury,
because the disease threatens more severe physical injury-painful
death-with certainty.1 58
The burden of reducing some risk is not always borne in the
same coin as the burden of the risk itself, however, and the threat that
risk reduction poses to freedom of action-to a fundamental condition
of human agency-is rarely as stark as the threat posed by the
elimination of background risk. Our motorcycle and smoking examples
are cases in point. In each of these cases, the cost of risk reduction is
the destruction or severe curtailment of the risky activity itself. The
cost is to the values realized by the activity. The cost is not to one of
the fundamental conditions of human agency-not to freedom of
action-but to a use to which people have put their freedom. Costs of
this kind are important because freedom of action is a condition of
value, not a thing of value in itself. Activities of value give freedom of
action its point. Freedom of action matters because there are a wide
variety of things worth doing, a large set of values worth realizing. It
is therefore important that a diverse range of activities be allowed to
flower.
Against this deference to the wide range of values realized by
diverse activities weighs the need not to endanger life and limb
lightly. So we must make judgments of comparability. And if it is
important that a wide range of activities be allowed to prosper because
the set of values worth realizing is large, it is also difficult to make
judgments of comparability when the value of some activity is pitted
against devastating injury. In cases in which the value of an activity is
at stake, the magnitude of the cost depends on the goods that the
activity realizes, but it also depends on who bears the cost, on how
voluntarily they choose to engage in the activity and shoulder its
158. However strong the case may be for administering the Pasteur vaccine for rabies to a
victim of the disease, it is, of course, generally impermissible to administer it without the consent
of the victim. The patient's right to refuse treatment is another example of a right that may
constrain the otherwise justified pursuit of harm minimization.
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costs, and on the existence or absence of alternative ways of realizing
the values at stake. In cases like these, judgments of comparability
are difficult, contestable, and contextual.
V. APPLICATION: COMPARABLE VALUE IN SAFETY AND FEASIBILITY
ANALYSIS
A. Comparable Value and Safety-Based Risk Regulation
With these general ideas and particular examples in mind, let
us return to the topic of safety-based regulation. In contrast to the
risks of motorcycling and smoking, safety-based regulation is usually
directed at risks (of devastating injury) that we can hardly avoid in
the course of normal life in our society. Toxins in our food, air, and
water are the principal targets of this kind of risk regulation. 159 We
cannot avoid eating food, breathing air, or drinking water. By and
large, moreover, we bear these risks whether or not we participate
directly in farming or in discharging particular toxins into the air and
water (though we are all beneficiaries of these activities in diffuse and
indirect ways). The risks subject to safety-based regulation are thus
markedly different from the primary risks of motorcycling and
smoking not only in the voluntariness with which they are borne, but
also in the extent to which they are borne by the people who
participate in creating them. The risks subject to safety-based
regulation are largely unavoidable.
The harms threatened by the risks subject to safety-based
regulation are a particular sort of irreparable injury. The "costs" of
"unsafe" food, air, and water are borne in irreparable injury to health,
and health is an essential condition of effective human agency, a kind
of "primary good." What about the benefits of bearing risks to health
(or, the flip side of the coin, the costs of reducing such risks)? How
should we characterize them? Pesticide residue on our crops is the by-
product of the pursuit of greater agricultural productivity, and toxins
in our air and water are by-products of ordinary, economically
productive activities (ubiquitous by-products, perhaps). The
enactment of safety-based regulatory statutes expresses a categorical
judgment that the costs these productive activities must bear in order
to eliminate significant risks of devastating harm are acceptable. We
need not inquire into the costs of eliminating significant risk on a
159. See KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 952.
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case-by-case basis, and we need not attend to the marginal balance of
cost and benefit in any particular case, because the benefits of
significant risk are simply not comparable to the incidence of harm to
human health that is their price. The safety-based regime in place for
the regulation of the risks of pesticide residues on agricultural
products, for example, expresses the conclusion that no amount of
increased agricultural productivity can justify imposing a significant
risk of devastating disease. The benefits of more risk-the increased
yield in crops harvested per acre planted and the like-are not the
kind of benefits that can justify the increased incidence of devastating
injury that is their price.
Why might a reasonable legislature come to the conclusion that
the benefits of increased agricultural productivity cannot justify
imposing a significant risk of devastating injury? In part, because a
reasonable legislature should reject the central idea of unrestricted
cost-benefit analysis-that all goods are commensurable, fungible at
some ratio of exchange. Statutes like the Food Quality Protection Act
of 1996 reject this idea of universal commensurability. They implicitly
single out health for special protection. Safety-based statutes assume
that health (like the physical integrity of the person) is a kind of
primary good-something that each person needs in order to realize
her aims and aspirations over the course of a normal life span,
whatever those aims and aspirations may be.160 Health has a special
urgency. It is part of a package of goods which are essential conditions
of rational agency, and it takes priority over lesser, inessential goods.
Health should only be sacrificed when we stand to gain more of
something comparable.
But a hierarchical view of human interests is only one part of
the justification for safety-based risk regulation. Safety-based risk
regulation also rests on particular, historically and socially contingent
claims of value. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, for example,
implicitly rests on the particular, historically contingent claim that
more yield per acre of crop planted is not a good comparable to a
significant risk of irreparable health injury. Why? Because health is,
for each of us, an essential condition of effective agency whereas the
benefits of increasing the yield of crop per acre are not-for us-
measured in the attainment of an equally essential good. For us, the
160. On "primary goods as citizens' needs," see RAWLS, supra note 17, at 187-90. See
generally id. at 173-211. The contrast between needs and preferences (or wants) is fundamental
to the contrast between safety-based regulation and cost-benefit analysis. The idea here is more
general than Rawls's conception of "primary goods." It might, for example, be possible to
elaborate it in terms of Amartya Sen's notions of "functionings" and "capabilities." See SEN,
supra note 30. See generally supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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benefit of increased agricultural productivity is simply increased
wealth, and the wealth obtained is not an essential condition of
anyone's agency. We should not, therefore, treat risks to health and
yield per acre as commensurable goods and let maximum overall
benefit fix the proper balance between them. Were we poorer, matters
might well be different. The benefit of increased agricultural
productivity might be measured in our ability to provide adequate
nutrition to each member of our society. Adequate nutrition is an
essential condition of effective agency, one comparable to health in its
urgency. Contingent social facts thus make the benefits of increased
agricultural productivity not comparable-for us-to significant
health risks.
The same combination of a hierarchical conception of human
interests with historically and socially contingent facts is capable of
explaining and justifying the application of safety-based risk
regulation to air and water pollution. Air and water, like food, are
necessities. And breathing and drinking, like eating, are unavoidable
activities. Breathing the air and drinking the water should not put our
health in significant peril, unless the cost of eliminating that peril
threatens our agency in some comparable way. In an affluent society,
when the cost of eliminating significant health risks from breathing
the air and drinking the water is measured simply in wealth forgone,
the cost of eliminating significant health risk is not comparable to the
cost of bearing such risk. In poorer or less technologically advanced
societies, matters might be different. It might, for example, be
impossible to reduce the risks of air and water pollution to
"insignificance" without seriously impairing the ordinary productive
activities which generate such pollution, and that might make those
workers most disadvantaged by the pollution worse off, rather than
better off.
Safety-based risk regulation, in short, is justified when the
costs of eliminating significant risks of devastating injury are simply
not comparable to-and fall far short of-the benefits of doing so.
When this is the case, the safe-level standard then fixes the acceptable
level of risk. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996161 is correct to
require tolerances for pesticide residue on food products to be set at a
level at which "there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result
from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including
all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which




there is reliable information,"1 62 even in light of the special
susceptibility of infants and children to harm from toxic substances,163
if attaining this level of safety will not impose a burden comparable to
a significant risk of devastating physical injury. When are costs
comparable? When the burden of bearing the precaution necessary to
reduce a significant risk of devastating injury-and all
indistinguishable risks-to the point of insignificance is of a kind
which might outweigh the burden of devastating injury that is the
price of the risk. The burden of eliminating all insignificant risks of
devastating injury, for example, is comparable to the burden of
bearing them, because the elimination of all risks requires the
elimination of all activity. 164 The elimination of all activity burdens an
essential condition of agency-the freedom to act-even more than
insignificant risk of devastating injury burdens the physical integrity
of the person, another essential condition of human agency.
The presence of comparability marks the point at which
tradeoffs begin. Within the framework of federal risk regulation,
comparability marks the point at which feasibility-based regulation of
risks of devastating injury replaces safety-based risk regulation. When
are burdens to major, productive economic activities-the kind of
governed by both safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation-
"comparable" to significant risks of devastating injury? Feasibility-
based risk regulation is constructed around an answer to that
question: Burdens to ordinary, productive economic activities-
activities like milling cotton, refining petroleum, and growing crops-
are comparable to significant risks of devastating injury when they
threaten the long-run flourishing of those activities. Feasibility-based
risk regulation supposes that the value realized by the major,
productive economic activities of our society is comparable to, and
generally greater than, significant risk of devastating injury. It is this
claim that we must now explore.
B. Comparable Value and Feasible Risk Reduction
Workplace risks are the primary domain of feasibility-based
risk regulation, OSHA is the primary practitioner of feasibility
analysis, and workers are the primary beneficiaries of the feasibility
standard. Feasibility-based risk regulation as practiced by OSHA
162. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
163. § 346a(b)(2)(C).
164. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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presumes that the productive economic activities to which it applies
are sufficiently valuable that shutting them down would cause greater
hardship than allowing them to continue, when their continuation
involves imposing significant risks of devastating injury which can
only be reduced by jeopardizing the long-run survival of those
activities. The judgment of comparability at work here is a simple one:
The risky activity being regulated is sufficiently valuable that
shutting the activity down would work a greater hardship to those
who benefit from it than would asking those workers endangered by
the activity to bear significant risks of devastating injury. The well-
being of workers is the natural focal point for appraising relative
hardships, because workers are both the principal victims of the
activities' risks and the principal beneficiaries of feasibility-based risk
regulation. When would shutting down a major, productive activity
like milling cotton or refining petroleum work a greater hardship upon
the workers employed by those activities than bearing the significant
risks of those activities does? When shutting down the activity would
impair a representative worker's ability to realize her aims and
aspirations over the course of her life more than bearing the activities'
significant risk of injury would. When shutting down the activity
would make her worse off, not better off, over the long run.
There is a strong resemblance between the view that
feasibility-based risk regulation takes of the significant risks of major,
productive activities and the view that safety-based risk regulation
takes of insignificant risk. Feasibility analysis tolerates significant
risk when it is the price of particular major, productive activities.
Safety-based risk regulation tolerates insignificant risk as the price of
activity itself. Even under the best of circumstances, a background
level of risk of devastating physical injury must be accepted, because
the cost of eliminating it is the prohibition of all activity, and the
prohibition of all activity is a cure worse than the disease. It impairs
our capacity to pursue our conceptions of the good over the course of
complete lives more than the background level of risk itself does.
Feasibility analysis applies these ideas in a more particular way. It
holds that we are justified in accepting a level of risk greater than the
background level of risk-a significant level of risk-when our only
alternative is to shut down a valuable activity. The implicit judgment
here is that shutting down the activity is a cure worse than the
disease.
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1. Feasibility Analysis as Practiced by OSHA
OSHA's judgments in the Cotton Dust Case illustrate the
application of feasibility analysis in both its technological and
economic aspects and the relation of feasible risk reduction to safety in
some detail. 16 5 Cotton dust is the primary cause of byssinosis or
"brown lung" disease, a serious, potentially disabling disease. 166
Because exposure to cotton dust is the primary cause of brown lung
disease, the disease is "a distinct occupational hazard associated with
cotton mills." 16 7 At the time of the Cotton Dust Case, an estimated one
in twelve retired cotton workers suffered from byssinosis. 168 The best
contemporary studies of the health effects of prolonged workplace
exposure to cotton dust suggested that the exposure to "lint free cotton
dust" could never be safe at any level higher than 0.2 mg of such dust
per cubic meter, or 200 ug/m3. OSHA concluded that this upper limit
of safe exposure should be used to define the "permissible exposure
limit" ("PEL") for exposure to cotton dust over the course of an eight-
hour workday. Attaining this PEL, however, was not always feasible,
therefore:
OSHA interpreted the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard to protect
against material health impairment, bounded only by technological and economic
feasibility. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative proposal for a PEL of 500
ug/m 3 in yarn manufacturing, a proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at
least Grade 2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the Standard to be both
technologically and economically feasible based on the evidence in the record as a whole.
Although recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust would still cause
some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless rejected the union proposal for a 100 ug/m3 PEL
because it was not within the "technological capabilities of the industry." Similarly,
OSHA set PEL's for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 ug/m3 in part because
of limitations of technological feasibility. Finally, the Secretary found that "engineering
dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even with massive expenditures by the
industry," and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL of 750 ug/m3 for
weaving and slashing. 169
The "safe" level of 100 ug/m3  is thus technologically
unattainable, and the best attainable level-the technologically
feasible-level of 200 ug/m3 is often economically infeasible. Levels as
high as 750 ug/m3 were accepted for weaving and slashing-one
activity within the enterprise of milling cotton-because lower levels
could not be achieved even with massive industry expenditures on
safety. Bearing that higher risk of brown lung disease is justified by
165. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
166. See supra note 27.
167. The Cotton Dust Case, 452 U.S. at 498.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted).
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the fact that the benefits of having the activity of milling cotton
outweigh that risk. Put differently, the justification for bearing the
risk is that it can only be avoided by shutting down the activity, and
the value of the activity is greater than the devastation that is its
price.
The Cotton Dust Case thus makes plain the conception of
comparability espoused by the feasibility test and squarely frames the
issues that test raises. Feasibility analysis, as practiced by OSHA,
holds that the cessation of an activity is a cost comparable to and (in
general) greater than the cost of bearing a significant risk of
devastating injury. The basic criterion of comparability employed by
feasibility analysis is therefore a localized and more relaxed
application of the criterion employed by safety analysis. Safety
analysis views the shutting down of all activity as a cost sufficient to
justify bearing insignificant risk of devastating injury from any given
activity. Feasibility analysis considers the shutting down of major
productive activities in our market economy as a cost sufficient to
justify bearing significant risk of devastating injury from such
activities.
By considering the cessation of significant productive activities
in a market economy to be comparable in kind and generally greater
than a significant risk of devastating injury, feasibility analysis
extends the idea of comparable value in a way which we have not yet
encountered. This case does not involve minimizing the same disease
(like the vaccine example), minimizing severe health injury (like the
rabies example), or realizing a distinctive form of value which might
figure prominently in some plausible conception of the good (like the
motorcycle example). It is a case in which the instrumental, everyday
activity of earning a living and generating wealth justifies bearing a
significant risk of devastating injury. Comparing significant risks of
devastating injury to the termination of economically productive, but
everyday, activities is plainly controversial. If we picture this tradeoff
at the level of an individual life, its merits are uncertain. Losing a
job-the consequence to those most severely affected of shutting down
some ordinary economic activity-does not seem comparable to losing
life or limb or to suffering a health impairment which will
permanently and severely impair normal functioning and shorten the
span of one's life-typical consequences of serious occupational
diseases. We should, it seems, fear devastating injury more than job




What is the case for treating the cessation of a major,
productive economic activity as comparable to a significant risk of
devastating injury? The claim to comparability rests, I believe, on
three ideas. First, feasibility-based risk regulation assumes that the
activities to which it applies are ones for whose importance the market
has already vouched. It accepts-defers to-the validity of this prior
test of value. Second, feasibility-based risk regulation-like safety-
based risk regulation-accepts the importance of socially contingent
facts. The major, productive economic activities which feasibility-
based risk regulation accepts as comparable in value to a significant
risk of devastating injury are contingent and historically transient-
but nonetheless terribly important-features of our economy. Third,
feasibility analysis appeals implicitly to the idea that, in terms of
value, the major, productive activities to which it applies are
indistinguishable. The case for shutting down one major productive
activity is therefore a case for shutting down all similar activities.
That price is too high to pay for the elimination of significant risk.
The first of these ideas is that ongoing, productive activities
that flourish in a market economy have significant value. Because
they have passed the market's test of value, we may presume that
their overall benefits outweigh their overall costs. 170 Shutting down
such activities therefore removes something of significant value to
many people-workers, consumers, suppliers, shareholders.
The second idea asserts that contingent social facts-accidents
of history, if you like-can embed themselves so deeply in the
structure of our social life that what once might never have taken root
can now only be uprooted at enormous cost. We can readily imagine
social worlds without the activities governed by OSHA-style feasibility
analysis-social worlds without cotton clothing or petroleum products.
We know that such social worlds have existed in the past, and we
expect a social world without petroleum products to exist at some
point in the future. Those who have lived and who will live without
170. Some readers may be troubled (and rightly so, I believe) by the fact that the underlying
test of value is essentially a utilitarian or economic one. I shall take this up in Part VI.C. It is
worth noting, however, that feasibility analysis would proceed in the very same way if we
adopted an underlying test based on fairness. Imagine a social world such as our own except that
the workings of the market economy satisfied the requirements of Rawls's difference principle.
We would then say that the activities in question were valuable not because they had passed a
market test of cost-justification, but because they were part of an economic system which was to
the advantage of all those who participated in it. This situation would give us a different reason
to count the shutting down of significant productive activities in that world as a serious harm, a
reason of fairness, not utility. Should the objection therefore be directed against the conception of




cotton shirts or petroleum products surely have not suffered and will
not suffer great hardship-hardship comparable to devastating
physical injury-because they are deprived of the fruits of these
activities.
Yet feasibility analysis as practiced by OSHA treats the
termination of activities such as cotton milling and refining petroleum
as a harm both comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury
and generally greater than such a risk. The assumption is that the
worlds in which these activities would not be sorely missed are
different social worlds from our own. Activities such as refining
petroleum and milling cotton are deeply entrenched in our social
world. Ending them abruptly would cause massive, unpredictable
dislocation. Shutting down the activity of refining petroleum, for
example, is essentially unthinkable. Petroleum products are knit so
tightly into the fabric of our daily lives that we cannot simply decide to
do without them without working inconceivable disruption in our
lives.
The third idea applies a test of generalization and makes a
claim about the outcome of that test. This criterion parallels and
repeats, in a more localized manner, an important part of the
argument for tolerating insignificant risks of devastating physical
injury. If a remote risk of devastating injury is indistinguishable from
many other such risks, fairness requires us to eliminate all such risks
if it requires us to eliminate any of them. If, for example, the risks
created by driving to the movies are indistinguishable from a host of
other remote risks created by trivial errands, we must eliminate all of
these risks if we choose to eliminate any of them. Eliminating all of
these risks is, however, undesirable. Some very low risk of devastating
injury is the price of activity, and activity is essential to the leading of
any worthwhile human life. The undesirability of eliminating all risk
explains and justifies the otherwise puzzling significance criterion
found in both safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation.
A parallel, but more particular, argument supports the
assumption that the shutting down of a productive activity is a
disvalue comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury.
Suppose that we chose to stop milling cotton or refining petroleum,
because these activities cannot be conducted without imposing
significant risks of devastating injury. Fairness would then require us
to stop all similar productive activities-all major, productive
activities which cannot be conducted without imposing significant
risks of devastating injury. If milling cotton and refining petroleum
are typical of the class of productive activities to which feasibility
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analysis applies, this result is unacceptable. Perhaps the life prospects
of those most endangered by cotton milling would be better if we
eliminated that activity and no other class of persons would suffer a
worse hardship than those most endangered by cotton milling now do.
Perhaps the same is true if we ceased refining petroleum (although I
doubt it), but the more activities we add to the list, the less persuasive
the claim that we are gaining value, not losing it. Shutting down most
of the major productive activities in our economy would be a harm
comparable to bearing a significant risk of devastating injury.
Shutting down most of the major productive activities in our economy
almost certainly would not be to the ex ante advantage of the workers
employed by those activities and most exposed to their risks.171
Insofar as it is correct to claim that the case for ceasing one
major productive activity is a case for shutting down all of them, this
is a persuasive argument. That claim, however, should give us pause.
The argument against shutting down most of society's major
productive activities is an argument of fairness-the workers
employed by those activities would be harmed in the long run by the
elimination of these activities, even though these activities exact a
significant toll on the lives and health of those very workers. Yet the
fact that these activities flourish in our market economy vouches not
for their fairness, but for their efficiency. The major, economically
productive activities to which feasibility-based risk regulation applies
flourish in our market economy, and they would not if their costs
exceeded their benefits. The market's test of value is roughly and
loosely utilitarian. (Roughly, because actual markets do not work
perfectly. Loosely, because markets measure value in wealth, and
wealth is not identical to utility. These imperfections, however, are not
what should give us pause.) Activities may be net beneficial in market
terms-their economic benefits may exceed their costs-without being
fair in the sense of working to the long-run advantage of those they
171. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 466-67 (2001) (holding, in part,
that § 109(b) of the Clean Air Act does not permit the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection agency to consider implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality
standards).
[RIespondents argue... [that] the economic cost of implementing a very stringent
standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in
cleaning the air-for example, by closing down whole industries and thereby
impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon those industries. That is
unquestionably true, and Congress was unquestionably aware of it .... Section
110(f)(1) of the [Clean Air Act] permitted the Administrator to waive the compliance
deadline for stationary sources if, inter alia, sufficient control measures were simply
unavailable and "the continued operation of such sources is essential.., to the public
health or welfare."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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most disadvantage. So there is cause for concern: Feasibility-based
risk regulation may realize fairness within boundaries fixed by
efficiency.
2. Feasibility Analysis in the Common Law of Products Liability
The general point that market demand alone cannot guarantee
the value of an activity becomes even clearer when we consider the
possibility of extending feasible risk reduction from workplace risks to
product risks. 172 Bringing feasibility analysis to bear on product risks
involves (1) presuming that the products to which our test of justified
precaution applies are beneficial because they have passed the
market's test of value, and (2) requiring products to be as safe as they
can be without impairing their usefulness. The second element of the
risk-utility test for product defectiveness articulated in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. 173 embraces this second requirement:
For purposes of analysis, we can distinguish two tests for determining whether a
product is safe: (1) does its utility outweigh its risk? and (2) if so, has that risk been
reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the product's utility? ... The
second aspect of strict [products] liability ... requires that the risk from the product be
reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its utility. 1 74
Insisting that risk reduction not impair product usefulness
sharply limits the critical bite of feasibility analysis. Some significant
product risks cannot be feasibly reduced, because reducing the risk
deprives the product of its usefulness. It is not, for example, feasible to
eliminate the risk of devastating accidental (and intentional) injuries
from sharp steak knife blades, even though dulling knife blades to the
172. It is also possible to extend the safety norm to product risks. Potter v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co. does just that: "There might be cases in which the jury would be permitted to
hold the defendant liable on account of a dangerous design feature even though no safer design
was feasible (or there was no evidence of a safer practicable alternative)." 694 A.2d 1319, 1333
(Conn. 1997) (citation omitted). This assertion was made in the course of explaining how the
"consumer expectation" test that Connecticut applies to design defects differs from the "risk-
utility" test advocated by the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability. Id. at 1333-34.
Potter and Beshada serve as reminders that prescriptions of more than cost-justified
precaution are not confined to federal statutes or jury verdicts. Indeed, common law cases
prescribing more than cost-justified precaution are easy to find. See, e.g., Bayer v. Crested Butte
Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1998) (holding ski lift operators to "the highest
degree of care commensurate with the lift's practical operation"); Brillhart v. Edison Light &
Power Co., 82 A.2d 44, 47 (Pa. 1951) (ruling that a supplier of electric current is bound to use the
"very highest degree of care practicable" to avoid injury: "When human life is at stake, the rule of
due care and diligence requires everything that gives reasonable promise of its preservation to be
done, regardless of difficulty or expense .. ") (citation omitted).
173. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
174. Id. at 545.
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point where they cannot cut human flesh poses no technological
challenge at all. Dulling steak knives until they can no longer cut
human flesh makes them unfit for their intended use. Tinkering a bit
with our earlier discussion of the unusually great risks of motorcycles
provides another example.' 75 Suppose that the exposed character of
motorcycle gas tanks creates a significant risk of devastating injury, a
risk which stands out in comparison to the background risks of riding
motorcycles.' 76 Suppose, too, that we might reduce the risks of injury
from gas tank explosions to the point of insignificance by encasing gas
tank and passengers in separate, enclosed compartments. Would this
precaution pass muster under the feasibility test? The answer, plainly,
is "no." The heightened risks associated with motorcycle gas tanks are
inseparable from the characteristics that distinguish motorcycles from
cars. 177 These characteristics define the activity of motorcycling; they
give it its distinctive value as a form of recreation and as a mode of
transportation. The greater safety of an encased passenger
compartment separated from the gas tank comes at the price of killing
the joy of the activity. The precaution transforms the activity of
motorcycling to the point at which it is no longer the same activity.
The precaution is "infeasible" because it destroys the product.
In both of these examples, the case for limiting precaution to
the point at which further precaution would impair the usefulness of
the product rests on the first element of Beshada's test being met: the
product's usefulness must be greater than the risk that is its price.
Some products plainly fail this test. Assault weapons, for instance, are
widely banned, on the ground that the risks of their illegitimate use
exceeds whatever legitimate value they may have. 178 If we adopted a
market test of value and used it to limit the reach of feasible risk
reduction, we would handle assault weapons differently. There is,
after all, a market demand for such weapons. If we took that market
demand to vouch for the product's value we would cut precaution short
at the point where further precaution impaired the weapons'
usefulness. We would refuse, for example, to disable the capacity for
continuous firing that makes assault weapons especially useful as
175. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text,
176. This supposition is contrary to our earlier discussion, and probably incorrect. See supra
125-26 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 12275.5 (West 2000):
The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in Section 12276 based
upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower
that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially
outweighed by the danger that it can used to kill and injure human beings.
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instruments of mass murder. Yet limiting precaution in that way
would strike most of us as perverse.
The facts of the assault weapon example are, of course, special.
The market demand for assault weapons derives at least in part from
their usefulness as instruments of mass murder. 179 The market
demand for assault weapons is therefore generated in part by
consumer preferences we wish not to satisfy but to thwart. That
particular fear is not present in the case of most products or in the
case of the productive economic activities subject to feasibility-based
risk regulation by OSHA. In more typical cases, the worry is that
legitimate market demand is insufficient to vouch for the value of the
product or activity in light of its unavoidable risks. The original VW
Beetle, for example, was driven off the market in part by increasingly
stringent regulation of automobile safety.18 0 The judgment expressed
by that regulation was that the Beetle's benefits were not sufficient to
overcome its substantial risks, notwithstanding substantial consumer
demand for the car. The hazards of a toy gun that shoots rubber
bullets might likewise be sufficient to outweigh the utility of the
product whether or not consumers want to purchase the gun.181
The general lesson here is plain enough: Just as there are
games which are not "worth their candles" even though someone
might like to play them, so too there are products and activities which
are not worth their unavoidable risks, even though the market
demands them. The presumption built into OSHA's practice of
feasibility analysis that, because the productive activities subject to
that analysis flourish in our market economy, their value is
comparable to and generally greater than any significant risks of
devastating injury the activities may create, is therefore open to
question. And we have reason to pursue this question: The practice of
feasible risk reduction is justified by ideas of fairness whereas the
institution of the market is justified by the idea of efficiency. Activities
179. The marketing director of the gun manufacturer whose assault weapons were used to
kill eight people and wound six others in a rampage at a San Francisco law firm told the New
York Times that
he welcomed damning criticism by law enforcement of the TEC-9, a popular weapon
with criminals. He explained: "I'm kind of flattered. It just has that advertising tingle
to it. Hey, it's talked about, it's read about, the media write about it. That generates
more sales for me."
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 134 (Cal. 2001).
180. Paul Dean, The New Beetle: 23 Smiles per Gallon, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at El ("[11n
1977, plagued by poor sales.., crimped by federal safety and pollution demands, the Beetle went
away."); accord Volkswagen Pushing Memories with Beetle: Ever-Popular Car Not the Inexpensive
Model of Old, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 1998, at E8.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. e, at 21-22 (1997).
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which satisfy the test of efficiency may well fail to satisfy the demands
of fairness.
VI. Is FEASIBILITY-BASED RISK REGULATION FAIR?
We need to retrace our steps a bit. Whenever we press
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification, we insist that some
value requires that we not maximize the net economic benefit
extracted from the activity whose risks are at issue. This decision to
leave wealth on the table requires justification in terms of some value
urgent enough to trump the claims of efficiency. Feasibility-based risk
regulation draws its justification for pressing precaution beyond the
point of cost-justification from considerations of fairness. It is only fair
to ask some to bear significant risk of devastating injury if the burden
of eliminating that significant risk (and the devastation that is its
eventual price) is comparable to the burden of bearing it. We have
argued that a particular criterion of fairness best reconciles two
essential conditions of rational agency: (1) the freedom to pursue
valuable ends and activities and (2) security understood as the
physical integrity of one's person. We have argued that-where
devastating risk is concerned-practices of risk imposition are fair
when they reconcile these two conditions of rational agency in a way
which is (1) to the greatest long-run advantage of either a
representative member of a "community of risk," or (2) when a
"community of risk" is not present, to the greatest long-run advantage
a representative member of the class of those most disadvantaged by
the risks, unless an alternate reconciliation would work greater
disadvantage to some other class of persons. For feasibility analysis to
be fair in this sense, the long-run flourishing of the activities to which
it applies must outweigh the significant risk of devastating injury that
is the price of that flourishing. The benefit of those activities to those
who bear their significant risks must be greater than the burden of
the risks themselves. And here there is cause for concern.
That concern has two sources. First, feasibility analysis
depends on contingent social facts. It equates the survival of
particular productive economic activities with significant threats to
our health and bodily integrity. OSHA's application of feasibility
analysis assumes that shutting down activities such as the milling of
cotton and the refining of petroleum is a harm comparable to, and
generally greater than, bearing a significant risk of devastating injury
at the hands of such activities. Extending feasibility analysis to a
common law context-product design-involves counting the
elimination of a class of products as a harm comparable to, and
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generally greater than, bearing a significant risk of devastating
injury. Yet our attachment to these particular activities is historically
and socially contingent. They were not comparably important to us
once, and they will cease to be comparably important at some point in
the future. This dependence on socially contingent facts seems to
threaten feasibility analysis with arbitrariness and triviality. It seems
that grave harms such as death and devastating injury may be
equated to almost any loss, so long as that loss is of something
sufficiently entrenched in our social world.
In part, this worry has its source in the discrepancy in the
degree of contingency of the goods being compared. The importance of
bodily integrity and physical health to effective agency is both clear
and dependent on facts about us which are contingent, but only at a
very deep level. So long as we are mortal, and so long as our bodies are
vulnerable to grave physical injury, death and devastating injury
constitute the gravest of threats to our agency.18 2 The importance of
milling cotton or refining petroleum is, by contrast, less clear and
dependent on contingent facts which are not as deep and thus much
more likely to change. The importance of particular types of products
whose significant risks can only be reduced by impairing their
usefulness-consider the significant risks of moderately priced
subcompacts or of sport-utility vehicles and motorcycles' 3-is even
less clear. This discrepancy threatens the claim that the two kinds of
burdens-devastating physical injury and shutting down major
productive activities-really are comparable.
But this worry also has a second source, highlighted earlier.
Feasible risk regulation, as practiced by OSHA, accepts a market test
for the value of the activities to which it applies. Feasibility analysis
cuts its criticisms of significant risk short, when pursuing that
criticism would jeopardize the productive economic activities to which
182. Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95, 190 (1961) (pointing out the
connection between "human vulnerability" and "the most characteristic provision of law and
morals: Thou shalt not kill.").
183. It is infeasible to make moderately priced subcompact cars as safe as larger cars or
luxury small cars because of the expense. Sport-utility vehicles are unusually prone to roll over,
because of their high and narrow wheelbase, but it is infeasible to eliminate this risk because
that high, narrow wheelbase is essential to their off-road capacity. We can eliminate the risk, of
course, but only at the cost of transforming the product. Cf. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d
730, 736, 738-39 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that a jury might reasonably find that the high, narrow
wheelbase which made a Ford Bronco sport-utility vehicle more prone to roll over than a normal
passenger car did not constitute a defect under the risk-utility test-because the design and its
risks were essential to the vehicle's off-road usefulness-but did constitute a defect under Ford's




it applies. Feasibility analysis thus counts the continued vitality of
basic productive activities comparable to and valuable enough to
justify bearing significant risk of devastating injury. The value of
these activities is indicated by the fact that they prosper in our market
economy. The fear raised by this acceptance of market value is that
the market vouches not for fairness but for efficiency, for net social
benefit in the sense of wealth-maximization, and for mutual
advantage in the sense of Pareto superiority. Fairness, however, is
quite a different matter from efficiency.
A. Comparability and Contingent Social Facts
Feasibility analysis is hardly unusual in its dependence on
contingent social facts. Such dependence characterizes many legal
norms, including both safety-based risk regulation and cost-benefit
analysis. The case for prohibiting pesticide residue on agricultural
products, when such residue would impose significant risk of
devastating injury, for example, is justified by the contingent social
fact of having achieved a level of abundance which makes greater
agricultural productivity a luxury rather than a necessity. The
dependence of cost-benefit analysis on contingent social facts is, if
anything, often even deeper. Professor Viscusi, a leading practitioner
of cost-benefit analysis as applied to risks to life and limb, attempts to
tease out the actual value that people implicitly place on their own
lives-not the value that they would place if their valuations were
corrected for irrationality, imperfect information, and the effects of
living within institutions which are not themselves fully cost-
justified.18 4 The effect of doing so, however, is to make the practice of
cost-benefit analysis dependent on contingent social facts.
The acceptance of contingent social facts by both our laws and
the normative frameworks we invoke to justify them open both law
and justification to the charge that they are instruments of denial and
apology.18 5 By accepting so much of our existing social world, law and
legal justification suppress criticism and reform. Accepting contingent
facts as fixed points hides their contingency; it transforms accidents of
history, which might well be otherwise, into fixed and frozen
184. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1992). Viscusi's approach to valuing life is
summarized in KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 14, at 989-90.
185. This critique has been pressed by the critical legal studies movement. See, e.g., Robert
Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
413 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262-




arrangements. This acceptance cramps our legal and political
imaginations, binding them too closely to our actual practices. It
preempts criticism and makes it difficult even to envision
fundamental reforms. In short, the uncritical acceptance of contingent
social facts converts the ideals we invoke to justify our law from
powerful instruments of criticism into shameful apologies for flawed
arrangements.
As a call to open our eyes to the character of the legal
institutions and practices which surround us, this thesis of critical
legal studies is well taken and powerful. But any constructive concern
with the dependence of feasible risk reduction on contingent social
facts must take more particular issue with the practice of feasible risk
reduction and point us toward its reform. We need to identify some
way in which feasible risk reduction betrays the values it invokes by
accepting too much in the way of contingent social facts. Let us then
revisit our own first premises and see how they might lead us to fault
our present practices of feasible risk reduction. Our first premise is
that bodily integrity and the freedom to act (and so to impose risk) are
both essential conditions of rational agency. Other things being equal,
more of both is always desirable, and a substantial measure of each is
necessary if we are to pursue our conceptions of the good over the
course of complete lives. Within this framework, the importance of
avoiding serious accidents is quite evident. So long as we are mortal
beings with vulnerable bodies, we will have reason to fear devastating
accidental injury. 186
Our mortality and vulnerability are fundamental facts about
us. Physical vulnerability and mortality have always characterized
human beings. In contrast, the importance to us of various activities
whose elimination would remove significant risks of devastating
injury-driving our own cars, milling cotton, refining petroleum,
having reasonably inexpensive subcompact cars-depends on
contingent facts much less fundamental than having vulnerable
bodies and being mortal. Indeed, our attachment to any particular
activity is much more contingent than our need for physical health
and bodily integrity and our vulnerability to devastating injury. The
socially contingent character of the particular activities to which we
are attached might, then, be proof that we can and should learn to live
without them. We cannot live without intact bodies, but we can live
without cotton shirts or private passenger automobiles. The
importance of keeping our bodies intact, coupled with the socially
186. Cf. HART, supra note 182, at 191.
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contingent character of our dependence on the activities that endanger
us, might be reason for us to criticize these activities as less important
than physical integrity, not reason to equate them with physical
integrity. Bodily integrity is a precondition of rational agency in a way
that cotton shirts are not. Its preservation ought, therefore, take
priority over the flourishing of historically particular, socially
contingent activities.
This argument, though, proves too much. Our need for any
particular activity may not be as deep as our need for bodily integrity,
but our need for activities which are socially contingent and
historically transitory is as deep. It is through such activities-and
only through such activities-that we sustain other conditions of
rational agency and realize the diversity of values that give rational
agency its point. Unless we believe that we can reproduce ourselves
and realize an equivalent range of values through a set of activities
which do not create a significant risk of devastating injury, we cannot
take the shutting down of significantly risky activities lightly, simply
because each activity that we might shut down is socially contingent
and historically particular. Feasibility analysis therefore cannot be
faulted simply because it considers the continued flourishing of
contingent activities to be a value great enough to trump significant
risk of devastating injury. If it is to be faulted, it must be faulted for
the particular test of value it employs and, through that test, for the
particular activities it considers comparable. The right concern about
feasible risk reduction is that it counts any activity which flourishes in
a market economy as valuable enough to justify imposing significant
risk of devastating injury. Our first concern-our concern with
feasibility analysis's dependence on contingent social facts-leads us
to our second concern-that our practice of feasible risk reduction
relies on a questionable test of an activity's value.
B. Feasibility and Efficiency
The difficulty is that flourishing in a market economy vouches
not for the fairness of an activity, but for its efficiency. Fairness
requires that an activity which imposes a significant risk of
devastating injury be to the advantage of those most burdened by it,
in the sense that it reconciles their competing interests in liberty and
security more favorably than eliminating the activity does.'87 The
187. It is important to recall that matters are more complex when terminating an activity
would be to the advantage of those most endangered by it in the sense we have defined, but
would impose a comparable burden on others who benefit from the activity. Then we must decide
if the benefit to those others is greater than the burden of significant risk to the most
2003]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
risks that an activity imposes on those it most endangers-whether
they are workers, as in the case of OSHA regulations, or consumers
and users, as in the standard cases for product users-are fair to those
it most endangers when shutting down that activity (or withdrawing
that product) would make those most endangered by it worse off, not
better off. An activity is efficient when it makes the pie larger-when
it generates wealth, expanding the total resources at society's
disposal. Efficient activities are to the advantage of those who
participate in them only in a limited, Pareto sense. As long as those
who participate in efficient activities do so voluntarily (as well as
rationally and with adequate information), they are advantaged in the
sense that taking part in those activities makes them better off than
had they refused to participate. In the cases that are the objects of our
concern, Pareto superiority means that workers, customers, and
product users are better off by accepting the jobs they accept and
purchasing the products they purchase than they would be if they did
not accept those jobs or purchase those products, notwithstanding the
significant risks of those occupations and products.
Pareto superiority guarantees advantage against the
preexisting background of entitlements and opportunities, but it does
not guarantee fairness. A transaction can be Pareto-superior for a
party in a poor bargaining position, but still unfair. The deal struck
may give the party with superior bargaining power an unjust share of
the cooperative surplus-a share they would be unwilling to accept
from behind a "veil of ignorance," for example. Where risk of
devastating injury is involved, a Pareto-superior transaction may
burden the weaker party with an unfair risk-a significant risk that
might be eliminated without making either that party or anyone else
bear a comparable hardship. Pareto-superior transactions may be
unfair because they are influenced by existing background conditions
and inequalities. Inequalities of power may make it rational for
someone in a weaker position to enter into a transaction on particular
terms, but they do not make those terms reasonable-they do not
make those terms fair. Fair (or reasonable) terms are terms that the
parties would agree to if they ignored their particular advantages and
disadvantages and sought only to agree to terms that neither party
could reasonably reject.' 88 Pareto-superior transactions may be ones
endangered. In the kind of case we are considering, this would happen when the burden to
shareholders and consumers of shutting down a major productive activity is greater than the
burden to workers of bearing a significant risk of injury. In the analysis in the text, I ignore this
more complicated case.
188. On "reasonable rejection," see SCANLON, supra note 29, at 195-97, 202-18, 223-31.
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which would never meet this test of unforced agreement. They may
express not unforced agreement, but rather the coercive force of
preexisting inequalities in knowledge, wealth, bargaining power, and
so on. The fact that activities flourish in a market economy thus
guarantees that they are mutually advantageous in a Pareto sense
(roughly speaking, at least), but it does not vouch for their fairness.
With this background in mind, let us consider the fairness of
milling cotton, supposing that it is not feasible to both mill cotton and
avoid exposing workers to a significant risk of brown lung disease. Is
that activity valuable enough to justify the significant risk of
devastating injury that is its unavoidable price? Milling cotton under
the circumstances that we have supposed is fair to those workers
endangered by it if those workers would be harmed by the elimination
of the activity. They will be made worse off if ending the enterprise
saves them from exposure to a significant risk of severe health
impairment, but also leaves them unable to secure employment at all
comparable in its advantages (its wages, benefits, and general
desirability) to milling cotton. The loss of anything approaching
comparably advantageous employment counts as a harm greater than
bearing a significant risk of brown lung disease. Conversely, the
enterprise of cotton milling is unfair to those workers it most
endangers if shutting it down would make them better off-by
securing for them more protection of health and bodily integrity
without extracting an offsetting and greater loss in the benefits that
employment in the enterprise of cotton milling confers. Shutting down
the enterprise will make workers better off if those workers can find
employment in other industries and that employment is as
advantageous as milling cotton, without imposing cotton milling's
significant risk of devastating harm to their health.18 9
Let us next consider the fairness of selling subcompact cars,
supposing those cars to be significantly less safe, even after all feasible
safety features have been incorporated, than larger ones. The
enterprise of selling subcompact cars is to the advantage of those who
purchase and use them if those purchasers and users would be made
worse off by the disappearance of those cars from the marketplace-if
the disappearance of subcompacts, say, left them with no real choice
but to purchase larger but less safe cars on the used car market. The
189. For this to be true, the stringent safety regulations that shut down the cotton mills
would probably also have to stimulate other, better employment opportunities. If equally
advantageous but less dangerous employment preexisted the adoption of the regulation, the
workings of the market would, presumably, tend to drive cotton mills out of existence. Who
would bear its significant risks without any substantial offsetting advantage? If this is so, it is a
practical reason why OSHA should practice feasibility analysis as it does.
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enterprise of selling subcompact cars is not to the advantage of those
who purchase them if adopting stringent safety measures that would
drive such cars off the market would improve the well-being of their
would-be purchasers by giving them access to safer cars at a
sufficiently small increase in price. 190 It may have been fair, for
instance, for stringent safety standards to drive the original VW
Beetle from the American automobile market. 191 The disappearance of
the original Beetle from the market eliminated a significantly unsafe
automobile without depriving subcompact car buyers of cars to
purchase.' 92 On the contrary, the stringent safety regulations that
played a role in the disappearance of the original Beetle appear to
have improved the lot of subcompact car buyers by securing
substantially more safety without depriving would-be subcompact car
buyers of the transportation of their choice. The improvement in their
security was not cancelled out by a comparable decrease in their
freedom of action.
C. Valuing Activities: Feasibility, Fairness, and the Market
We do have reason to worry about the way in which a market
test of value vouches for the value of the activities governed by
feasible risk reduction, in both its statutory and common-law
incarnations. The market vouches for the efficiency of the activities
which flourish within it, not for their fairness. The efficiency of market
transactions is assured by their being mutually advantageous (Pareto-
superior) for market actors, but the fairness of market transactions is
not. The fairness of market transactions depends on the institutional
framework within which those transactions take place. Market
transactions are generally fair when they take place against a just
background-against a just (or fair) assignment of initial rights and
entitlements and a just distribution of resources, both governed over
time by principles which prevent initially fair starting points from
deteriorating into unfair distributions of rights and resources. It is the
sustained presence of "background justice" which vouches for the
fairness of individual transactions. In the absence of background
justice, nothing guarantees the fairness of particular Pareto-superior
190. Recall that a full statement of what our fairness criterion requires would add the clause
"without working a comparable hardship on anyone else." See supra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text. We are ignoring this complication for purposes of simplicity.
191. See supra note 187.
192. For completeness, we can add "and without working a harm comparable to the risk of
devastating injury characteristic of VW Beetles on anyone else."
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transactions, or particular efficient activities. 193 When feasibility
analysis accepts the fact of an activity's flourishing in the marketplace
as proof that the activity is valuable enough to justify bearing a
significant risk of injury, it accepts efficiency as a limit on fairness.
The fact that efficiency limits the critical bite of fairness in this
way is cause for concern. Activities that are efficient but unfair are
activities that unjustifiably burden those they most disadvantage.
Unfair activities could be conducted on different terms-terms which
would make those they most disadvantage better off without imposing
a comparable burden on anyone else (on any other class of persons
affected by the activity). When feasibility analysis counts the
continued flourishing of efficient but unfair activities a value great
enough to justify bearing significant risk of devastating injury, it
appears to be reneging on its promise of fairness. Feasible risk
reduction, it seems, should press the claims of fairness further. An
activity should be counted valuable enough to justify significant risk of
devastating injury only if (1) it is to the advantage of those most
endangered by it in the sense that its disappearance would leave them
with less favorable conditions for the exercise of their rational agency,
or if (2) ending the activity would impose a greater disadvantage on
another class of persons affected by the activity-would make the
conditions for the exercise of their rational agency even less favorable.
It is easy to imagine how we might press the claims of fairness
further than feasible risk reduction does. Two paths are possible. The
first path suggests itself when we take the position of ideal legislators,
fixing the respective domains of the safety and feasibility norms.
When those most endangered by an activity would be made better off
by the elimination of its significant risks, and no other class of persons
would be made to bear a comparable burden by the elimination of the
activity, we should insist that the activity satisfy the more rigorous
standard of safety-based risk regulation or pass from our social world.
Feasible risk reduction should govern either activities whose presence
in our social world is to the advantage of those they most endanger, or
activities whose disappearance would work a greater hardship on
other classes of persons affected by the activity than the hardship that
their significant risks work on those they most endanger. Safety-based
risk regulation should govern activities whose presence in our social
world is not valuable enough to justify bearing significant risk of
devastating injury. If we are correct to think that a nontrivial number
of the activities which flourish in our economy are not fair, not
valuable enough to justify the significant risks that are the price of
193. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT §§ 14-15, at 50-55 (2001).
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their presence in the world, we should expect this approach to expand
the domain of safety-based risk regulation and shrink the domain of
feasibility-based risk regulation.
The second path is most attractive when we assume the
position of common law judges, seeking to make our law the best that
it can be. We should follow the lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Beshada, whose embrace of a common law variant of feasible risk
reduction was one piece of a two-part standard of acceptable product
risk:
For purposes of analysis, we can distinguish two tests for determining whether a
product is safe: (1) does its utility outweigh its risk? and (2) if so, has that risk been
reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the product's utility? The first
question looks to the product as it was in fact marketed. If that product caused more
harm than good, it was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. We can therefore
impose strict liability for the injuries it caused without having to determine whether it
could have been rendered safer. The second aspect of strict liability, however, requires
that the risk from the product be reduced to the greatest extent possible without
hindering its utility. Whether or not the product passes the initial risk-utility test, it is
not reasonably safe if the same product could have been made or marketed more
safely. 194
Common-law courts should be willing, in other words, to judge
some products-and by extension, some activities-as not worth
having, because their significant risks of devastating injury are not
offset by some comparable benefit.
Both of these paths will prove well worth pursuing in many
cases, but other paths may be worth pursuing, and perhaps even more
so. Feasibility analysis as presently practiced by OSHA already
assigns the agency a formidable institutional task. Determining if and
how major productive activities can reduce their principal risks of
serious physical injury without jeopardizing their long-run vitality is a
complex and challenging undertaking, in both its technological and
economic dimensions. Determining just which major productive
activities should be driven from our world because the workers they
endanger would be better off without them is an even more heroic
undertaking-a worthy task for an omniscient legislator at least, if
not an omniscient God. Questions of institutional competence give us
equal reason to pause when we consider the common law analog to
feasible risk reduction. Deciding if the Ford Pinto's gas tank presents
a significant risk of injury that is feasible to reduce is a difficult but
manageable task. Deciding if consumers would be better off without
Ford Pintos is not a decision a judge or jury is well situated to make,




especially on the basis of the facts developed in the course of litigating
a particular injury. Negligence has never been widely and effectively
applied at what economists call the "activity level."'195 Courts may
sometimes be able to make well-founded judgments that an activity's
benefits do not justify the harm that is its price, but it seems unlikely
that they will be able to do so routinely. 96
The larger problem here is that the fairness of market
transactions, and of the activities that emerge from them, depends
principally on the establishment of what I have been calling
"background justice." In order for markets to operate fairly, initial
entitlements must be fixed properly, and the operation of the market
must be regularly adjusted to maintain background justice.
Institutions designed to make and apply accident law are not ideally
equipped to establish and maintain background justice. Their
interventions in market activities are, almost inevitably, bound to be
piecemeal and ad hoc. They target particular unfair activities, not the
deeper conditions which allowed those activities to flourish. To be
sure, accident law institutions have a role to play in the construction
of a just basic structure of society. The appropriate specification of the
domains of safety, feasibility, and cost-justified1 97 risk reduction is
likely part of a just basic structure, but surely not the whole of it. The
allocation of basic rights and the distribution of wealth, income, and
property are also essential parts of it. The lion's share of the task of
ensuring that only fair activities flourish in a market economy may
best be shouldered, then, by those institutions charged with ensuring
the justice of the basic structure.
The best way to address the problem of unjust activities, in
other words, might be indirectly, not directly. It may not be best to
195. For the distinction between "care" and "activity" levels, see generally Steven Shavell,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
196. The court in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. held that it was error not to permit a jury to
consider whether the risk of injury created by an above-ground pool "so outweighed the utility of
the product as to constitute a defect." 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983). O'Brien, however, was
overruled by New Jersey's tort reform statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987). See
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1251-52 (N.J. 1990). This legislative reversal
places the task of determining which products should be sold firmly in the hands of the market.
The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability concedes the possibility that an entire product-
not just a design feature-may be defective, but takes the view that cases where courts should
find entire products defective are exceedingly rare. Judging entire products unfit is, in general, a
task better suited to legislatures. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. e
(1997).
197. Taking only the cost-justified level of precaution is proper when the harm done is
repairable, so that redistribution after the fact of injury can distribute the burdens and benefits
of risky activity fairly. In this case, it makes sense to proceed by maximizing the size of the pie
and redistributing to achieve fairness thereafter. See Sargentich in KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S
MANUAL, supra note 14, at 20-7.
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extend the practice of feasibility analysis in regulatory and common
law so that it regularly appraises the value of the activities whose
risks are at issue, in light of the conception of fairness we have
embraced. Instead, it may be best to seek a just basic structure. The
existence of a such a structure would ensure, for the most part, that
the activities flourishing within it are fair. Imagine, for example, a
social world such as our own, except that the workings of the market
economy satisfied a principle of fairness. (Rawls's difference principle
is one such principle.) The economic activities which flourished in such
a social world would be counted fair not because they had passed a
market test of cost-justification, but because they arose out of a fair
background situation through procedurally fair transactions and
flourished in an economic system governed by principles of justice
which ensured that it worked to the advantage of all those who
participated in it-even those it most disadvantaged. 198 In this social
world, we would have a reason of fairness to count the shutting down
of major productive activities a grave injury, comparable to a
significant risk of devastating harm. In this world, feasible risk
reduction might proceed in essentially the way that it proceeds in our
world, but because it would operate against a different background, its
assumption that the survival of major productive activities was a
value great enough to justify bearing a significant risk of devastating
harm would stand on firmer ground.
Of course, the best way to realize fairness at the level of
activities under ideal circumstances (or very favorable ones) may not
be the best way to do so under our present, less-than-ideal
circumstances. For us, it may often be the case that the best way to
achieve fairness at the level of activities is by incorporating the
evaluation of activities into the practice of feasible risk reduction,
where possible. This question of strategy, however, lies beyond the
boundary of our present inquiry. There is, however, one last question
to address. We have argued that considerations of fairness justify
safety- and feasibility-based regulation of risks of devastating injury.
Fairness thus condemns cost-justified precaution as insufficiently
protective of physical integrity in an important range of cases. But we
have said nothing about other kinds of cases. Is cost-justified
precaution compatible with the demands of fairness in cases in which
the injuries risked are not devastating?
198. See RAWLS, supra note 193, at 50, 52 (noting that "background institutions which
commonly with the two principles of justice are necessary to make it likely that economic and
social inequalities contribute in an effective way to the general good or, more exactly, to the
benefit of the least advantaged members of society").
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VII. COST-JUSTIFIED PRECAUTION AND COMPENSABLE INJURY
The argument against taking only cost-justified precaution
against significant risks of devastating injury rests on two basic
claims. First, devastating injury is not commensurable at some ratio of
exchange to all of the goods which might be gained by inflicting it. The
cost-justified level of safety unfairly devastates a few for the sake of
trivial gains to many. Second, devastating injuries severely impair
normal functioning and normal life in ways which cannot be undone.
The victims of devastating injury can never be restored to their pre-
injury level of well-being. But not all harms are severe and
irreparable. Not all harms must remain indivisibly concentrated on
those who suffer them. When injury is inflicted on commercial
property, for example, the harm is reparable even if the property is
wholly destroyed.199 Even the total destruction of a piece of
commercial property results in a loss that money can measure and
redress. The payment of money damages can undo the harm done,
disperse it across those who have benefited from the imposition of the
risk that issued in that harm, and rectify any unfairness in the
distribution of benefit and burden. Does fairness require more than
cost-justified precaution in such cases? Or can its concerns be met by
redistributing the costs of accidents after they occur?
The answers to these questions are, in principle, simple and
clear. When harm done can be fully repaired after the fact by the
payment of money damages, and so apportioned among those who
benefit from its infliction, fairness supports taking efficient
precautions-and only efficient precautions-against injury. Pitching
the level of precaution at the cost-justified point maximizes the dollars
involved. Because reparation can undo all the damage done, we can
treat the victim fairly by providing monetary reparation for the harm
done. Because harms that can be measured in money can be divided
and dispersed, we can apportion the costs of accidents fairly after
those accidents have happened. We can spread the cost of reparation
among those who have benefited from the imposition of the risk in
question. Because money can both repair the damage and be
redistributed to satisfy the demands of fairness, fixing the level of
precaution at the point at which it will maximize the money available
does not conflict with the demands of fairness. If anything, it enables
the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the risks involved
199. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (upholding




by maximizing the resources available to meet the demands of
fairness. When injuries are moderate and fully compensable, the
economic argument that questions of fair distribution should be
addressed only after efficient precautions have been taken is sound
and persuasive. 200
To be sure, two qualifications are in order. The first concerns
the existence and characteristics of risk impositions which elude the
sharp distinction that we have just drawn. On the one hand, there are
risks which threaten both some devastating injury and some fully
compensable injury. And there are cases that fall between the poles of
this continuum, cases in which the harms threatened by some risk are
neither plainly severe, irreparable, and indivisible, nor clearly
compensable. Harm to property invested with personality may be such
a case.20 1 On the face of the matter, harm to property invested with
personality is qualitatively different from harm to commercial
property because investing property with personhood may make the
property irreplaceable. This difference does not put harm to such
property on a par with harm to life and limb-that is commodity
fetishism-but the impossibility of fully compensating an owner of
irreplaceable property for the harm caused by its destruction makes
the destruction of such property a more serious harm than the
destruction of commercial property. Other things being equal, this
makes the benefit of avoiding injury to irreplaceable personal property
greater than the benefit of avoiding injury to commercial property.
Taking fair precaution against injury to such property requires
responding appropriately to the intermediate urgency of the harm
being risked. 20 2
200. This argument has long been made by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, albeit on a
grander scale than I have in mind here. Kaplow and Shavell argue that questions of distribution
ought to be left entirely to the tax system, while all other legal regimes pursue efficiency. See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note
19. The argument in the text is that when the injuries at issue are moderate and fully
compensable, tort law's legitimate concerns with the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits
of risky activity supports taking only cost-justified precaution and redistributing accident costs
after accidents occur. Tort suits themselves are, in my view, a permissible mechanism for
effecting the appropriate distribution.
201. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN L. REV. 957, 1003-06
(1982).
202. Fixing the fair level of precaution against harm to property invested with personality
will also require responding appropriately to other special problems that such property presents.
For example, unless we can reach agreement about the kinds of property that generally are and
should be invested with personality, taking into account the investment of some property with
personality threatens to introduce a form of subjective valuation into the calculation of the
burdens and benefits of appropriate precaution. Objective valuation of burdens and benefits is
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There will, therefore, be a range of cases in which the severity
of the harm risked falls in between the zones of devastation and full
compensability that we have identified, either because both kinds of
harm are risked or because a different, intermediate kind of harm is
risked. The fair level of precaution for such cases is not settled by the
distinction that we have drawn between devastating injuries and fully
compensable ones. It seems likely, nonetheless, that clarifying these
two ends of the continuum and the levels of precaution that they
require is an important first step to identifying the fair level of
precaution for mixed and intermediate cases.
The second qualification concerns the scope of the efficiency
argument that we have accepted. In the law and economics literature,
the normative claim that efficient precaution and only efficient
precaution should be taken, with fairness concerns being addressed by
the independent redistribution of wealth, is generally linked to the
claim that redistribution should be effected by the tax system, not the
tort system. Embracing the argument that efficient precaution is fair
when risks are moderate and fully compensable does not entail
embracing this further claim. The choice between reparation (either
by tort law or by administrative plan) and redistribution by the tax
system raises questions of fairness and corrective justice-questions
which cannot be settled simply by showing that redistribution through
the tax system is more efficient than redistribution by any other
institutional mechanism (if it is). Fairness requires that those who
benefit from the injury inflicted make reparation to those who have
suffered those injuries; only then are burden and benefit proportional,
so far as they can be. Redistribution through the tax system will not
automatically realize fairness in this sense.20 3 The case for reparation
by those who have inflicted harm to those they have harmed finds
further support in what Martin Stone has called "the unity of doing
and suffering":
The situation in which one person suffers through the doing of another ... has a natural
saliency for human beings. It is bound to figure in the most basic thinking about what
sorts of happenings can be controlled, and related to this, it produces such natural
psychological responses as resentment and revenge.
2 0 4
essential to securing liberty and ensuring fairness. For discussion of the problems involved in
using subjective standards of well-being, see Keating, supra note 7, at 367-73.
203. For a general discussion of fairness and the choice among institutional mechanisms for
its implementation in accident law, see Gregory C. Keating, Fairness and Two Fundamental
Questions in the Law of Accidents 37-43 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
204. Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 235, 259
(1996); see also Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
LAW OF TORTS 131-82 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). Rousseau observes, in a similar vein, that
"the nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does." Baier, supra note 20, at 63 (quoting
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Reparation registers the moral significance of the fact that the
injuries addressed by accident law are injuries inflicted by some
human beings on other human beings. Separating deterrence and
distribution on efficiency grounds, by contrast, ignores the moral
significance of "the unity of doing and suffering."
A second caveat is therefore in order. The argument that
efficient precaution is fully compatible with and supportive of fairness
in the case of moderate and fully compensable injuries does not,
therefore, imply the further conclusion that redistribution through the
tax system is preferable to reparation, whether by tort or by
administrative scheme. The choice between tax and reparation must
be made with more than efficiency in mind.
VIII. CONCLUSION: VINDICATING OUR MORAL INTUITIONS
It is easy to lose the thread of an argument in its details,
especially when the details are complex and the thread winds its way
through them at length. It may be best, then, to conclude simply by
recalling the nerve of the argument. Devastating injury presents
special problems of fairness, both because devastating injuries are
especially severe and because they cannot be repaired ex post. The fair
treatment of risks of devastating injury requires that we take more
than cost-justified precaution against their occurrence.
Fairness is concerned with the distribution of burdens and
benefits-with how well competing claims are satisfied. 205 Treating
people fairly generally requires us to align burden and benefit
proportionally. When injuries are not devastating-when the harm
they wreak can be fully repaired through ex post compensation-
redistribution after the fact can align burdens and benefits
proportionally. When risks threaten devastating injury-premature
death or severe harm whose debilitating effects can never be fully
undone-redistribution after the fact cannot align burden and benefit
proportionally. Fairness must be done at the time that the risk is
imposed, not after it issues in injury. When injuries are devastating,
special problems of proportionality arise. The claims of those who are
put at significant risk of death or debilitation are especially urgent. It
is unfair to treat devastating harm as comparable to any benefit which
might be gained, no matter how trivial that benefit is in the lives of
those who reap it. Sacrificing an urgent interest-the interest in
Rosseau). This observation should be read broadly. It is the fact of agency-not "ill will" or even
negligence-which makes the issue of reparation by the harmdoer morally salient.
205. See Broome, supra note 21, at 95.
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avoiding premature death or devastating injury-for the sake of
trivial gains to others cannot be justified to those whose urgent
interests are sacrificed. It is only fair to ask some people to bear a
significant risk of devastating injury when the burden of eliminating
that risk is comparable to the burden of bearing it. Devastating injury
must only be risked either when those most imperiled by the risk
would be harmed even more if the risk were curtailed, or when an
improvement in their security would impose a comparable burden on
others affected by the risk.
Cost-benefit analysis-and cost-justified precaution-is
insensitive to the demand that death and devastation should only be
risked in the name of some comparable value. Cost-benefit analysis
treats all costs and all benefits as fungible at some ratio of exchange,
and aggregates costs and benefits across persons. This analysis
supposes that some loss of life or health can always be offset by some
increase in wealth, no matter how trivial the effect of that increased
wealth in the lives of those who benefit from it. Cost-justified
precaution, therefore, demands too little in the way of precaution
against risks of death and devastation. The safety and feasibility
norms, in contrast, articulate standards of precaution which are
sensitive to these requirements of fairness and comparability and
which focus on the appropriate class of risks. The significance
requirement singles out a class of risks of devastating injury that are
worthy candidates for reduction. The safety and feasibility standards
themselves embody conceptually coherent and normatively defensible
alternatives to cost-justified precaution. In a society in which food is
abundant enough to ensure adequate nutrition, the implicit claim of
comparable value made by the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996 2 6-that the benefits of increased agricultural productivity are
not sufficient to justify bearing a significant risk of serious disease-is
a reasonable and convincing one. In a society in which food is
abundant enough to ensure adequate nutrition, forgoing more
agricultural productivity is not likely, over the long run, to work a
harm comparable to that worked by a significant risk of devastating
disease.
The assumption embedded in feasibility analysis-that the
cessation of the productive activity on which a worker or consumer
depends is a hardship comparable to a significant risk of death or
debilitation-is likewise often a reasonable one. When the loss of one
job entails the loss of all jobs in that industry, and when that
industry-milling cotton, refining petroleum-is indistinguishable
206. See supra note 71.
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from many other basic industries, the disadvantage of eliminating
significant risk of devastating injury to the workers put at risk of such
injury may well be greater than the disadvantage of bearing that risk.
Even when the assumption that the party most disadvantaged by the
activity in question would be made worse off by the elimination of that
activity is mistaken-even when the activity itself imposes an unfair
burden on those it most imperils-it may still be best, in general, to
accept the continued flourishing of the activity as a limit on the
pursuit of fair risk reduction. Ensuring that only "fair" activities
flourish is a task whose demands generally outstrip the institutional
competencies of courts and administrative agencies.
Because they are sensitive to the incommensurabilities of value
which help to define the problem of devastating injury, and because
they articulate normatively defensible and conceptually coherent
alternatives to cost-justified precaution, the safety and feasibility
standards merit careful consideration. Their prescriptions of the
precaution that we must take against risks of severe and irreparable
injury are the best articulation our legal system has yet offered of our
inchoate, but deeply held, moral intuition that especially stringent
precautions must be taken against risks of death and devastation.
[Vol. 56:653748
Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment:
Teaching the Evolution Controversy in
Public Schools
Jay D. Wexler 56 Vand. L. Rev. 751 (2003)
In recent years, the question of how public schools ought to
teach evolution has once again surfaced as an exceedingly controversial
issue. In June of 2001, the U.S. Senate adopted nonbinding language
in an education bill urging public schools to teach students about the
evolution controversy. Although this language was ultimately taken out
of the final bill, it is clear from the legislative history of the proposal
that some Senators supported the proposal because they believe science
classrooms should present alternatives to evolutionary theory, such as
the purportedly scientific theory of "intelligent design." Moreover, in
2002, the State Board of Education in Ohio considered a number of
proposals that would have required or encouraged public schools in
that state to teach alternatives to evolution, including intelligent de-
sign. This Article evaluates the Senate and Ohio proposals as a vehicle
for considering the more general question of whether school boards or
other administrative bodies ought to encourage or require schools to
teach intelligent design as an alternative to evolution. The Article ar-
gues that schools should teach about religious views on the origins of
the universe and human life in separate classes about religion as a way
of preparing students to participate effectively in American democratic
processes. The Article further argues, however, that schools should not
teach alternatives to evolution in the science classroom. Such an educa-
tional reform, the Article suggests, would bring about little if any edu-
cational benefit, would send the wrong message to students about relig-
ion, and would pose a significant risk of constitutional invalidation.

